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Introduction 
The introduction of the new European satellite navigation system Galileo 
will dramatically change the current scenario dominated by the US Navstar 
GPS system. Indeed, Galileo will bring new concepts and breakthrough 
ideas to guarantee not only a very accurate position, but also a high margin 
of safety through its built-in integrity algorithm. Integrity is the assurance, 
for the user, that the total system is able to provide an accurate position and 
that, in case of any failure, the system is able to timely warn the user and 
eventually correct the problem. Current GPS needs augmentation systems to 
provide integrity, while Galileo will be able to satisfy the very demanding 
safety requirements in civil aviation precision approaches without any 
further augmentations. However, it is very important to point out that the 
two systems will not be in competition, because Galileo is designed to be 
interoperable with GPS. Therefore, once Galileo will be finally deployed, 
users will be able to rely on two constellations: this means a high 
improvement in the accuracy of the position and a higher margin of safety 
due to the combined system. Thus, it is necessary to assess performances of 
a combined system, defining its parameters and its concepts and finally 
deriving a new multisystem integrity concept, which is able to take the best 
from both GPS and Galileo. The aim of this thesis is then to propose new 
multisystem integrity algorithms able to get all the benefits coming out from 
a combined system. To do this, a deep analysis of the integrity concept and 
its applications in civil aviation for each single system is mandatory. This 
represents the basis for the derivation of a standard multisystem scenario, 
where integrity is the added value. 
 
The thesis is divided in five chapters, starting from the current state of the 
art and going further to the new concepts and ideas that will be presented 
throughout the documents. 
 
In the first chapter, general definitions and basic mathematical and statistical 
models that characterise modern satellite navigation systems are described. 
Then, the integrity concept is introduced, starting from the operational 
parameters that describe it and the minimum requirements a navigation 
system should satisfy for civil aviation applications. 
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In the second chapter, the way the integrity service is provided by different 
systems is deeply explained: GPS in combination with a proper 
augmentation system (SBAS), GPS in combination with specific receiver 
algorithms (RAIM) and Galileo stand-alone. In particular, the specific 
equations and algorithms used to provide integrity in the different systems 
are analysed: Protection Levels computation for GPS/SBAS and RAIM 
algorithms, Probability of Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) 
computation for Galileo. 
 
Therefore, in the next two chapters some applications of the integrity 
concept for GPS for civil aviation are shown. Indeed, in the third chapter, 
RAIM algorithms for GPS are thoroughly analysed and tested in the single 
failure and dual failure cases. These tests are performed for specific 
geometry and specific receiver conditions. The purpose of this analysis is to 
show that RAIM algorithms, designed to detect only one failure, aren‟t able 
to protect user in case of two failures when using a single system (e.g., only 
GPS). This analysis provides the basis for one of the multisystem integrity 
techniques described in the last chapter. 
 
On the other hand, the fourth chapter analyses the augmented version of 
current GPS that is GPS in combination with the SBAS system. The 
European version of SBAS is EGNOS, which started to transmit his signal 
in 2006. This analysis deals with real signal processing in order to evaluate 
EGNOS reactions in presence of clock anomalies on GPS satellites. This 
analysis represents a first original contribution to the thesis, because an 
innovative and original technique is used. Indeed, the study that has been 
performed has considered a set of 2 years of data (2006 and 2007) and 
combines a Signal in Space approach with a user level approach. 
 
In the last chapter, the multisystem integrity is introduced. First, there‟s the 
need to define a combined system GPS+Galileo. Therefore, statistical and 
mathematical models defined for a single system in the previous chapters 
are here modified and extended. This study represents a second original 
contribution to the thesis, because, at the present, there aren‟t common 
accepted values for the different parameters that characterize a combined 
system. Then, a few multisystem integrity techniques are proposed and 
relative results are shown: this represents the third original contribution to 
the thesis. A first method considers the combination of GPS and Galileo 
orbital data together with the estimation of their range errors as the input for 
an extended RAIM algorithm. Thus, several RAIM algorithms have been 
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modified and extended in order to include data coming from a dual 
constellation, even in a multiple failures scenario. A second technique is 
based on the new Galileo Integrity algorithm, which is then modified in 
order to include also GPS data. This technique proposes an approach to 
combine the two systems that is different from the approach followed with 
the previous method. Indeed, the Galileo Integrity equation is based on a 
different concept with respect to the RAIM algorithms. Other possible 
techniques are then briefly introduced and described. 
 
Finally, the most interesting results are discussed and possible future 
research topics are introduced: indeed, the current scenario is continuously 
evolving, since the Galileo system is still under development and the GPS 
system is being upgraded to a modernised version. 
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Chapter 1    
Definitions and Assumptions for a GNSS 
System 
lobal Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is the standard generic term 
for satellite navigation systems that provide autonomous geo-spatial 
positioning with global coverage. A GNSS allows small electronic receivers 
to determine their location (longitude, latitude, and altitude) to within a few 
metres using time signals transmitted along a line of sight by radio from 
satellites. Receivers on the ground with a fixed position can also be used to 
calculate the precise time as a reference for scientific experiments. 
As of 2008, the United States NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) 
is the only fully operational GNSS. The Russian GLONASS is a GNSS in 
the process of being restored to full operation. The European Union's 
Galileo positioning system is a GNSS in initial deployment phase, 
scheduled to be operational in 2013. China has indicated it may expand its 
regional Beidou navigation system into a global system (COMPASS). 
India's IRNSS, a regional system, is intended to be completed and 
operational by 2012. 
1.1 GNSS systems 
GNSSs that provide enhanced accuracy and integrity monitoring usable for 
civil navigation are classified as follows: 
 
 GNSS-1 is the first generation system and is the combination of 
existing satellite navigation systems (GPS and GLONASS) with 
Satellite Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) or Ground Based 
Augmentation Systems (GBAS). In the United States, the satellite 
based component is the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), 
in Europe it is the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay 
Service (EGNOS), and in Japan it is the Multi-Functional Satellite 
G 
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Augmentation System (MSAS). Ground based augmentation is 
provided by systems like the Local Area Augmentation System 
(LAAS). 
 GNSS-2 is the second generation of systems that independently 
provides a full civilian satellite navigation system, exemplified by 
the European Galileo positioning system. These systems will provide 
the accuracy and integrity monitoring necessary for civil navigation. 
This system consists of two frequencies for civil use and a third 
frequency dedicated to system integrity. Development is also in 
progress to provide a modernized version of GPS for civil use with 
two frequencies, making it a GNSS-2 system. 
 
The original motivation for satellite navigation was for military 
applications. Satellite navigation allows for hitherto impossible precision in 
the delivery of weapons to targets, greatly increasing their lethality whilst 
reducing inadvertent casualties from misdirected weapons. Satellite 
navigation also allows forces to be directed and to locate themselves more 
easily, reducing the “fog of war”. 
 
However, GNSS systems have a wide variety of civil uses: 
 Navigation, ranging from personal hand-held devices for trekking, to 
devices fitted to cars, trucks, ships and aircraft 
 Time transfer and synchronization 
 Location-based services 
 Surveying 
 Entering data into a geographic information system 
 Search and rescue 
 Geophysical Sciences 
 Tracking devices used in wildlife management 
 Asset Tracking, as in trucking fleet management 
 Road Pricing 
 Location-based media 
 
Note that the ability to supply satellite navigation signals is also the ability 
to deny their availability. The operator of a satellite navigation system 
potentially has the ability to degrade or eliminate satellite navigation 
services over any territory it desires. 
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1.1.1 Current global navigation systems 
The United States' Global Positioning System (GPS) as of 2008 is the only 
fully functional, fully available global navigation satellite system. It consists 
of up to 32 medium Earth orbit satellites in six different orbital planes, with 
the exact number of satellites varying as older satellites are retired and 
replaced. Operational since 1978 and globally available since 1994, GPS is 
currently the world's most utilized satellite navigation system. 
 
The formerly Soviet, and now Russian, Global'naya Navigatsionnaya 
Sputnikovaya Sistema, or GLONASS, was a fully functional navigation 
constellation but since the collapse of the Soviet Union has fallen into 
disrepair, leading to gaps in coverage and only partial availability. The 
Russian Federation has pledged to restore it to full global availability by 
2010 with the help of India, who is participating in the restoration project.
 
1.1.2 Upcoming Global Navigation Systems 
The European Union and European Space Agency agreed on March 2002 to 
introduce their own alternative to GPS, called the Galileo positioning 
system. The system is scheduled to be working from 2013. The first 
experimental satellite, GIOVE-A, was launched on 28 December 2005. A 
second experimental satellite, GIOVE-B, was launched in April 2008. 
Galileo is expected to be compatible with the modernized GPS system. 
Hybrid receivers will then be able to combine signals from both Galileo and 
GPS satellites to greatly increase coverage and position accuracy. 
 
The Indian Regional Navigational Satellite System (IRNSS) is an 
autonomous regional satellite navigation system being developed by Indian 
Space Research Organization, which would be under the total control of 
Indian government. The government approved the project in May 2006, 
with the intention of the system to be completed and implemented by 2012. 
It will consist of a constellation of 7 navigational satellites by 2012. All the 
7 satellites will be placed in the Geostationary orbit (GEO) to have a larger 
signal footprint and lower number of satellites to map the region. It is 
intended to provide an absolute position accuracy of better than 20 meters 
throughout India and within a region extending approximately 2,000 km 
around it. A goal of complete Indian control has been stated, with the space 
segment, ground segment and user receivers all being built in India. 
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China has indicated they intend to expand their regional navigation system, 
called Beidou or Big Dipper, into a global navigation system; a program that 
has been called Compass in China's official news agency Xinhua. The 
Compass system is proposed to utilize 30 medium Earth orbit satellites and 
five geostationary satellites. Having announced they are willing to cooperate 
with other countries in Compass's creation, it is unclear how this proposed 
program impacts China's commitment to the international Galileo position 
system. 
 
The Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) is a proposed three-satellite 
regional time transfer system and enhancement for GPS covering Japan. The 
first satellite is scheduled to be launched in 2008. 
1.1.3 GPS frequency plan 
Current GPS signals consist of two radio frequency (RF) links: L1 and L2 
[5]. L1 carrier frequency is at 1575.42 MHz, while the carrier frequency for 
L2 is at 1227.6 MHz. Utilizing these links, the space vehicles (SVs) of the 
Satellite System shall provide continuous earth coverage for signals which 
provide to the US the ranging codes and the system data needed to 
accomplish the GPS navigation (NAV) mission. These signals shall be 
available to a suitably equipped user with RF visibility to an SV. 
Single frequency receivers (Standard Positioning Service – SPS) use only 
the L1 signal, while dual frequency receivers (Precise Positioning Service – 
PPS) combine it with the L2 signal. Obviously, a dual frequency receiver 
provides more accurate results, since it can get rid of the ionospheric error. 
Modern GPS will provide a third signal, the L5 signal, with carrier 
frequency at 1176.450 MHz. This will add further benefits to the final users. 
1.1.4 Galileo frequency plan 
The Galileo navigation signals will be transmitted in the four frequency 
bands indicated in the next figure [1]. These four frequency bands are the 
E5a, E5b, E6 and E1 bands. They will provide a wide bandwidth for the 
transmission of the Galileo Signals. Note that E5a and E5b signals are part 
of the E5 signal in its full bandwidth. 
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Figure 1-1: Galileo Frequency Plan 
 
 
The Galileo frequency bands have been selected in the allocated spectrum 
for Radio Navigation Satellite Services (RNSS) and in addition to that, E5a, 
E5b and E1 bands are included in the allocated spectrum for Aeronautical 
Radio Navigation Services (ARNS), employed by Civil-Aviation users, and 
allowing dedicated safety-critical applications. 
 
 
The next table summarizes signal specifications for current and modern 
GPS and for Galileo, including also the type of modulation that is used. 
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Frequency 
Band 
Carrier 
Frequency 
(MHz) 
Bandwidth 
(MHz) 
Modulation 
PRN codes 
(Mchip/s) 
Services 
Current 
GPS 
L1 1575.42 24 BPSK 
C/A=1.023 
and 
P(Y)=10.23 
SPS 
PPS (with 
L2) 
L2 1227.6 22 BPSK 
P(Y)=10.23 
or 
C/A=1.023 
PPS (with 
L1) 
Modernized 
GPS 
L1 1575.42 24 
BPSK 
C/A=1.023 
P(Y)=10.23  
SPS 
PPS BOC CD= 1.023  
TMBOC CP=1.023 
L2 1227.6 22 BPSK 
P(Y)=10.23 
C/A=1.023 
CM=10.23 
CL=767.25 
SPS 
PPS 
L5 1176.450 24 QPSK 10.23 SPS/SOL 
Galileo 
E1 1575.420 32 CBOC 
B=1.023  OS/CS/SOL 
C=1.023 - 
E6 1278.750 40 
M-BOC 
(TBC) 
B=5.115  CS 
C=5.115 - 
E5 1191.795 51 AltBOC   
E5a 1176.450 27.795 QPSK 
I=10.230  OS 
Q=10.230 - 
E5b 1207.140 23.205 QPSK 
I=10.230  OS/CS/SOL 
Q=10.230 - 
Table 1-1: GPS and Galileo signal specifications 
1.1.5 Navigation solution base-line 
In general, the basic linearized GPS measurement equation is: 
 
𝒚 = 𝑮 ⋅ 𝒙 + 𝝐 
Eq. 1-1 

where x is the four dimensional position vector about which the 
linearization has been made, containing the receiver coordinates in a 
selected reference system and the receiver clock bias: 
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𝒙 =  
𝑥
𝑦
𝑧
𝑏
  
Eq. 1-2 
 
y is an N dimensional vector containing the raw pseudorange measurements 
minus the expected ranging values based on the location of the satellites and 
the expected location of the user: 
 
𝒚 = 𝝆 − 𝝆𝟎 
Eq. 1-3 
 
where 𝝆𝟎 contains the initial guess of the receiver position x0 and of the 
receiver clock bias b0. N is the number of available measurements, which is 
given by the number of satellites in view. Clearly, N=4 is the minimum 
number of measurements needed to solve Eq. 1-1. 
G is the design matrix in the same coordinate system of x and is an N 
dimensional vector containing the errors in y. 
 
The weighted least squares solution for x can be found by 
 
 
𝒙𝑤𝑙𝑠 =  𝑮
𝑻 ⋅ 𝑾 ⋅ 𝑮 −1 ⋅ 𝑮𝑻 ⋅ 𝑾 ⋅ 𝒚 = 𝑲 ⋅ 𝒚 
Eq. 1-4 
 
where K is the weighted pseudo-inverse of G and where W is the inverse of 
the covariance matrix. Assuming that the error sources for each satellite are 
uncorrelated with the error sources for any other satellite, all off-diagonal 
elements of W are set to zero. The diagonal elements are the inverses of the 
variances corresponding to each satellite: 
 
𝑾 =
 
 
 
1
𝜍1
2 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯
1
𝜍𝑁
2 
 
 
 
Eq. 1-5 
 
These variances are defined in the range domain and are different for each 
satellite, because they depend on the elevation angle. They correspond to the 
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User Equivalent Range Error (UERE), because they include contributions 
for several sources of error, as described in Appendix A. 
The four elements vector xwls represents the weighted least square solution 
containing the correction to be applied to the initial guess of the receiver 
position (x0) and of the user clock bias (b0). The weighted least square loop 
usually converges in 3-4 iterations, even if the initial guess of the user 
position and the user clock are set to zero. 
The 1-sigma vertical accuracy in the position domain is given by: 
 
𝜍𝑉 =    𝑮𝑻 ⋅ 𝑾 ⋅ 𝑮 −1 3,3 
Eq. 1-6 
 
while in the horizontal plane the 1-sigma accuracy is given by: 
 
𝜍𝐻 =    𝑮𝑻 ⋅ 𝑾 ⋅ 𝑮 −1 1,1 +   𝑮𝑻 ⋅ 𝑾 ⋅ 𝑮 −1 2,2 
Eq. 1-7 
 
These measures give the 1-sigma expected accuracy in the vertical 
dimension and the 2-dimensional RMS expected accuracy in the horizontal 
dimensions respectively. The 1-sigma accuracy means that for the 68% of 
the time the position error lays inside a circle whose radius is equal to the 
accuracy requirement. The accuracies of these measures depend on the 
accuracies of the satellite covariances in the W matrix. On the other hand, 
the 95% accuracy corresponds to the 2-sigma value. Therefore, the 95% 
position accuracy is given by 1.96 ⋅ 𝜍𝑉 and 1.96 ⋅ 𝜍𝐻 for the vertical and 
horizontal cases respectively. This means that for the 95% of the time the 
position error lays inside a circle whose radius is equal to the accuracy 
requirement. 
The position error is given by 𝒙𝑤𝑙𝑠 − 𝒙 and it is usually computed in a local 
coordinate system (i.e., North, Easth, Up). Therefore, the vertical position 
error is the difference between the true Up component of the receiver 
position and the computed Up component of the receiver position. 
1.2 The Integrity concept 
Integrity is foremost a guarantee for the user that the information provided 
by the total system is correct and a critical operation can be safely 
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accomplished. Integrity strongly depends on the specific application and on 
the specific environment. All modern satellite navigation systems should 
provide the integrity service, because it is crucial in critical operations, such 
as airplane landing or safe approach to harbour. However, integrity is 
strictly related to other operational parameters, which will be here exposed. 
In order to accomplish a critical application, these parameters should 
assume a specific value, which is different for each application. These 
values are defined by international organisations in order to achieve the 
desired level of safety in the different environments, such as civil aviation, 
maritime and rail. Thus, the system (or the set of systems) used to calculate 
the position should be designed properly in order to fulfil these 
requirements, which are defined at the user level. In particular, GPS and 
Galileo have their own integrity concepts: the former uses an augmentation 
of the pre-existing system and it is now standardised and implemented in 
many receivers; the latter is still under development and it will provide its 
own integrity service as a stand-alone system. 
1.2.1 Operational parameters 
The Operational Parameters give a measure of the quality of a navigation 
system. 
 
Accuracy 
Accuracy is the degree of conformance between the estimated position and 
the actual position. For any estimated position at a specific location, the 
probability that the position error is within the accuracy requirement should 
be at least 95 percent. Therefore, the accuracy requirement is defined as a 2-
sigma value. Different accuracy requirements are provided for the horizontal 
and vertical errors.  
 
Integrity  
Integrity is a measure of the trust which can be placed in the correctness of 
the information supplied by the total system. Integrity includes the ability of 
a system to provide timely and valid warnings to the user (alerts) when the 
system must not be used for the intended operation. The integrity 
performance is specified by means of three parameters: 
 
 Alert limit (AL): this is the maximum allowable error in the user 
position solution before an alarm is to be raised within the specific 
time to alarm. This alarm limit is dependent on the considered 
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operation and each user is responsible for determining its own 
integrity in regard of this limit for a given operation following the 
information provided by the GNSS signal. There is a Vertical Alert 
Limit (VAL) and a Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL). 
 
 Time To Alert (TTL): the time to alert is defined as the time starting 
when an alarm condition occurs to the time that the alarm is 
displayed at the user interface. Time to detect the alarm condition is 
included as a component of this requirement. 
 
 Integrity Risk (IR): this is the probability during the period of 
operation that an error, whatever is the source, might result in a 
computed position error exceeding a maximum allowed value, called 
Alert Limit, and the user is not informed within the specific time to 
alarm. 
 
 
Continuity 
Continuity is the ability of a navigation system to provide required service 
over a specified period of time without interruption. Continuity relates to the 
capability of the navigation system to provide a navigation output with the 
specified accuracy and integrity throughout the intended operation, 
assuming that it was available at the start of the operation. The continuity 
risk is the probability that the system will be unintentionally interrupted and 
will not provide guidance information for the intended operation. 
 
Availability 
The availability of a navigation system is the ability of the system to provide 
the required function and performance at the initiation of the intended 
operation. Availability is an indication of the ability of the system to provide 
usable service within the specified coverage area. Signal availability is the 
percentage of time that navigational signals transmitted from external 
sources are available for use. Availability is a function of both the physical 
characteristics of the environment and the technical capabilities of the 
transmitter facilities. 
1.2.2 Integrity requirements for civil aviation 
The integrity requirements are proposed by the user community, in order to 
reach a certain level of trust in the position information. They represent the 
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desired values of the operational parameters for a specific operation and 
they are different for each application. These requirements don‟t depend on 
the system used to provide the position solution: indeed, it is the system (or 
the set of systems) used to provide the position that has to satisfy the 
requirements for a specific critical operation. 
The integrity requirements for the civil aviation have been standardised by 
the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and they assume 
different values for each specific phase of flight. 
1.2.2.1 Phases of flight 
The performance requirements are defined for the following operations 
identified by the ICAO: 
 
Oceanic En Route: this phase covers operations over ocean areas generally 
characterized by low traffic density and no independent surveillance 
coverage. 
 
Domestic En Route: operations in this phase are typically characterized by 
moderate to high traffic densities. This necessitates narrower route widths 
than in the oceanic en route phase. Independent surveillance is generally 
available to assist in ground monitoring of aircraft position. 
 
Terminal Area: operation in the terminal area is typically characterized by 
moderate to high traffic densities, converging routes, and transitions in 
flight altitudes. Narrow route widths are required. Independent surveillance 
is generally available to assist in ground monitoring of aircraft position. 
 
Non Precision Approach (NPA): non precision approach aids provide a 
landing aircraft with horizontal position information (2-dimensional 
approaches). Also called LNAV (Lateral Navigation). 
 
Approach and landing operations with vertical guidance – APV. Different 
types of APV approaches may be identified. They may be separated into 
two broad classes depending on the method retained for the provision of the 
vertical guidance during the approach: the first class which corresponds to 
APV approaches operationally approved today in some states rely on GNSS 
lateral guidance and on barometric vertical guidance generated through a 
Flight Management System (FMS). However barometric vertical guidance 
suffers from limitations in term of accuracy and a number of potential 
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integrity failures due to the necessity of manual input of local atmospheric 
pressure and of temperature compensation. Therefore the ICAO GNSS 
panel identified two performance levels identified as APV-I and APV-II 
which rely on GNSS vertical guidance rather than pure barometric vertical 
guidance. The lateral performance of these service levels is similar to ILS 
(Instrument Landing System) Cat I, while the vertical accuracy is slightly 
reduced. However the lateral and vertical integrity requirement is similar to 
ILS CAT I, making this performance level very attractive for the aviation 
community.  
 
Precision Approach (PA): during precision approach aids provide landing 
aircraft with vertical and horizontal guidance and positioning information 
(3-dimensional approaches). CAT-I, CAT-II and CAT-III categories of 
aircraft approaches are defined by ICAO according to the level of 
confidence that an adequately trained pilot in a suitably equipped aircraft 
can place into the system he is using to help him landing the aircraft safely. 
The precision approach is divided in two main segments: the aircraft first 
follows the indication provided by the landing system, then the pilot takes 
over in the final part and visually checks whether the aircraft is in a position 
to land. CAT-I conditions exist when the Decision Height (DH) is at 200 
feet (about 60 m) or above and the Runway Visible Range (RVR) is 2400 
feet (about 730 m) or greater; CAT-II conditions exist when the decision 
height is between 100 and 200 feet (between 30 – 60 m) and the RVR is 
1200 feet (about 365 m) or greater; CAT-III conditions exist when the 
visibility is poorer and include conditions with zero visibility. Category III 
is subdivided in the following categories: 
 
 CAT-IIIa: path descends to touchdown zone. Requires a RVR 
greater than 200m 
 CAT-IIIb: automatic landing includes rollout to a safe taxi speed. 
Requires a RVR greater than 50m 
 CAT-IIIc: fully automatic landing, including taxiing. No RVR 
requirement 
 
In addition to the previously described phases of flight, a new procedure has 
been recently added, called LPV-200, which will provide vertical guided 
approach capability to an altitude as low as 200 feet (61 meters). 
 
The following figure shows the evolution of the different phases of flight 
during an aircraft operation. 
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Figure 1-2: Evolution of aeronautic phases of flight 
1.2.2.2 Performance requirements for navigation and approach in 
aeronautical applications 
Accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability include overall system 
performances (ground sensors and infrastructures, airborne sensors, pilot or 
auto-pilot); in particular accuracy performance includes aircraft navigation 
sensor accuracy and pilot capacity to flow on a specified desired path. 
The measure of lateral/vertical position deviation from the desired path is 
named TSE (Total System Error) as shown in the next picture. 
 
 
Figure 1-3: Total System Error is constituted by Navigation Sensor Error and Flight 
Technical Error 
 
The TSE is composed by Flight Technical Error (FTE) and Navigation 
Sensor Error (NSE); the first one is linked to the ability of the pilot or auto-
pilot to conduct and control the aircraft flight path over the defined flight 
path while the NSE refers to aircraft sensor errors together with the input 
signal errors to the navigation sensors, such as GNSS SIS errors. Thus, 
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assuming these error components are random and independent, the mean 
square value of the TSE can be expressed as: 
 
𝜍𝑇𝑆𝐸
2 = 𝜍𝐹𝑇𝐸
2 + 𝜍𝑁𝑆𝐸
2  
Eq. 1-8 
 
The performance requirements in avionic applications are defined by ICAO 
and described in the GNSS Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) 
[7]. ICAO has created a special panel, widely known as GNSSP (GNSS 
Panel), in charge of deriving the GNSS-SARPS. These SARPS provide 
specific performance requirements for GNSS, so that the fulfilment thereof 
results in the suitability of the system for one or more RNP levels. They also 
constitute a basic technical standard for GNSS systems, including ground 
and space based augmentations (GBAS and SBAS respectively).  
In the process of SARPS derivation, the FTE component is removed in 
order to obtain requirements for the GNSS navigation system, isolated and 
uncoupled from the pilot or auto-pilot system. 
In the next table, the navigation performance requirements for civil aviation 
are shown. Requirements for the new LPV-200 procedure are provided by 
[8]. Requirements for CAT-II and CAT-III have not been published yet. 
 
Typical 
Operation 
Accuracy 
(95%) 
Alert 
Limits 
Integrity 
Time 
To 
Alert 
Continuity Availability 
En-route 
oceanic 
3.7 km (H) 
N/A (V) 
7.4 km (H) 
N/A (V) 
1-1x10
-7
 / h 300 s 
1-1x10
-4
 / h to 
1-1x10
-8
 / h 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
En-route 
continental 
0.74 km (H) 
N/A (V) 
3.7 km (H) 
N/A (V) 
1-1x10
-7
 / h 15 s 
1-1x10
-4
 / h to 
1-1x10
-8
 / h 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
En-route, 
Terminal 
0.74 km (H) 
N/A (V) 
1.85 km (H) 
N/A (V) 
1-1x10
-7
 / h 15 s 
1-1x10
-4
 / h to 
1-1x10
-8
 / h 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
NPA, 
departure 
220 m (H) 
N/A (V) 
556 m (H) 
N/A (V) 
1-1x10
-7
 / h 10 s 
1-1x10
-4
 / h to 
1-1x10
-8
 / h 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
APV I 
16 m (H) 
20 m (V) 
40 m (H) 
50 m (V) 
1-2x10
-7
 / 
app (150 s) 
10 s 1-8x10
-6
 / 15 s 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
APV II 
16 m (H) 
8 m (V) 
40 m (H) 
20 m (V) 
1-2x10
-7
 / 
app (150 s) 
6 s 1-8x10
-6
 / 15 s 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
LPV-200 
16 m (H) 
4 m (V) 
40 m (H) 
35 m (V) 
1-2x10
-7
 / 
app (150 s) 
6 s 1-8x10
-6
 / 15 s 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
CAT I 
16 m (H) 
4 m (V) 
40 m (H) 
10 m (V) 
1-2x10
-7
 / 
app (150 s) 
6 s 1-8x10
-6
 / 15 s 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
Table 1-2: Operational Performance Requirements for Civil Aviation Operations 
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It can be observed that requirements provided by the Panel are presented as 
SIS (Signal-In-Space) requirements. However, some of the parameters 
cannot actually be applied as SIS requirements without defining the user 
requirements. As a result, the Panel has developed the concept of a “fault-
free receiver” with a defined (nominal) performance to be used to measure 
the SIS. The fault-free receiver is defined to be a receiver with a nominal 
accuracy performance and because it is assumed to have no failures it does 
not contribute to the integrity and continuity performance. Besides, a range 
of values is given for the SIS continuity and availability requirements for 
certain phases of flight. This is due because the requirements are dependent 
on several factors relating to the air traffic environment in which the GNSS 
system is being used. These factors include the traffic density, the 
complexity of the airspace, the availability of alternative navigation aids, the 
availability of dependent surveillance (e.g. radar) and the possibility of ATC 
(Air Traffic Control) intervention. It is therefore not possible to give a 
single, globally applicable, continuity and availability requirements. For 
example the lower values given above are the minimum requirements for 
which a system is considered to be practical. 
In general these values are determined by airspace needs to support sole 
means navigation where GNSS has either replaced the existing navigation 
and infrastructure, or where no infrastructure previously existed. 
 
Navigation systems meeting all or parts of the Required Navigation 
Performance (RNP) parameters can support different operating procedures: 
 
Supplementary procedure: navigation system meeting only RNP accuracy 
and integrity performance. Then there is a need for a back up navigation 
system certified as “sole means”. However, during its operation the 
navigation system can compute navigation solutions irrespective of the sole 
mean system. 
 
Primary procedure: navigation system meeting RNP accuracy and integrity 
performances. In this case the navigation system can be used as primary 
mean of navigation due to the correctness of the position information 
computed by the navigation sensor. A primary procedure shall be 
complemented by a back up related procedure to be used in case of loss of 
continuity of service or unavailability, in order to start an alternative 
procedure to conduct the aircraft. A sole mean system as back up is not 
required. 
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Sole means procedure: navigation system meeting all RNP parameter 
performances. In this case the navigation system can be used as unique 
system in charge of assuring the security levels in terms of performances 
and continuity of the performances. 
1.3 General assumptions for a GPS system 
1.3.1 Probability of Failure 
When defining the satellite failure probability, some basic assumptions are 
commonly used: 
 
 All satellites are identical, and operate identically and independently 
 The GPS constellation is in a steady state, i.e. the satellites in orbit 
have randomly distributed ages (i.e., certain ones are at the start of 
their operational lives and others at the end) 
 All failure probability density functions have exponential models of 
the form [2]: 
 
𝑓 𝑡 = 𝑒−𝜆𝑡  
Eq. 1-9 
 
where  𝜆 =
1
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹
 and MTBF is the Mean Time Between Failures and it is 
given by: 
 
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠
 
 
The corresponding life distribution is: 
 
𝐹 𝑡 =  𝜆𝑒−𝜆𝑥 𝑑𝑥 =  −𝑒−𝜆𝑥  
0
𝑡
= 1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡
𝑡
0
 
Eq. 1-10 
 
The corresponding reliability function is therefore given by the expression: 
 
𝑅 𝑡 = 1 − 𝐹 𝑡 = 𝑒−𝜆𝑡  
Eq. 1-11 
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It should be noted that different probability density functions could be 
considered rather than the exponential model, in order to keep track, for 
example, of the age of the satellites or the type of failure which affects the 
most the satellite. Therefore, instead of a constant failure rate, a variable 
failure rate should be considered. However, this analysis is beyond this 
study and it is left for future works. 
 
From the above expressions, the probability p that at time t0 a satellite is 
working well and that during the period t0+T (where T is the period of 
operation) a failure occurs is given by the following expression: 
 
𝑝 =
𝐹 𝑡0 + 𝑇 − 𝐹 𝑡0 
𝑅 𝑡0 
=
𝑒−𝜆𝑡0 − 𝑒−𝜆 𝑡0+𝑇 
𝑒−𝜆𝑡0
= 1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑇  
Eq. 1-12 
 
It can be seen that the probability of failure only depends on the parameter 
T, i.e. the period of operation. It does not depend on t0 (corresponding to 
lack of memory). 
Thus, the probability Pfail,n,k  of having k unscheduled simultaneous failures 
on n satellites is:  
𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 ,𝑛 ,𝑘 =  
𝑛
𝑘
 𝑝𝑘𝑞𝑛−𝑘  
Eq. 1-13 
 
where p is the individual satellite failure probability and q=1-p. 
Usually, for k=1, it is assumed: 
 
𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 ,𝑛 ,1 ≈ 𝑛 ∙ 𝑝 
Eq. 1-14 
 
The GPS SPS signal specification [3] allows 3 major failures per year per 
constellation, where a major service failure is defined as a pseudorange error 
in excess of 150m. This value has been recently revised to 30m [4]. More 
precisely, GPS SPS Performance Standard (2001) has defined a major 
service failure as a departure from nominal system ranging accuracy that 
causes the SPS instantaneous ranging error of a healthy satellite to exceed 
30 meters while the User Range Accuracy (URA) multiplied out to 4.42 
standard deviations indicates less than 30 meters. URA is the expected GPS 
SIS range accuracy and it is a parameter broadcast in the navigation 
message. 
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3 major failures per year per constellation (24 satellites in the case of 
nominal GPS constellation) lead to a probability of failure per satellite of 
~10
-5
/h/SV. Aviation community, based on simulations and collected data, 
has assumed an average of 8 GPS satellites in view when calculating the 
satellite failure probability. Thus, the common used value for the probability 
of failure among all the satellites in view is: 
 
𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 = 1 × 10
−4/𝑕 
Eq. 1-15 
 
This is the value recommended in RTCA-MOPS from En-route to NPA [9]. 
1.3.1.1 Precision approach for GPS satellites 
For precision approach (e.g., LPV-200 category) the satellite failure 
probability is computed considering the time the Control Segment needs to 
detect and inform the user of an integrity failure from the onset of such 
failure. This time is assumed to be 1 hour for GPS, even if it is expected to 
be shorter. Therefore, during the approach, which lasts 150 seconds, there is 
one independent integrity sample and therefore the probability of having 1 
failure is given by: 
𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 ,𝑎𝑝𝑝 = 1 × 10
−4/𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐𝑕 
Eq. 1-16 
 
In this way, the probability of having one failure during the approach is 
bounded by the capability of the system to detect that failure, because the 
user doesn‟t know when, during the detection time interval, the approach is 
going to be performed (or, vice versa, the user doesn‟t know when the 
failure occurred when the approach operation started). In this method it is 
assumed that the independent sample is in the 150 seconds that are 
considered for the approach.  
It should be noted that modernized GPS is expected to detect failures and 
inform user in a shorter time, therefore the value of the probability of failure 
is expected to be smaller. 
 
Moreover, considering the equations described in the previous section, it is 
possible to derive also in this case the failure probability per satellite and the 
probability of multiple independent simultaneous failures. Furthermore, also 
common mode failures should be introduced now: a common mode failure 
is defined as a fault condition in which multiple satellite range 
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measurements simultaneously experience errors which could be consistent 
in the sense that they could be undetectable by RAIM, but also by the 
system. The rate of common mode faults causing multiple satellite integrity 
failures is usually assumed to be 1.3x10
-8
 per approach [17]. 
The next table summarizes these results. 
 
Parameters Recommended values 
GPS Satellite Failure 
Probability per satellite 
En-route to NPA 
1x10-5/h/SV 
GPS Satellite Failure 
Probability 
(8 satellites in view) 
En-route to NPA 
1x10-4/h 
GPS Satellite Failure 
Probability per satellite 
Precision Approach 
1x10-5/approach/SV 
GPS Satellite Failure 
Probability 
(8 satellites in view) 
Precision Approach 
1x10-4/approach 
GPS Common Mode Failures 
Probability 
Precision Approach 
1.3x10-8/approach 
Table 1-3: GPS Satellite failure probability 
1.3.2 Probability of Missed Detection 
A Missed Detection is defined to occur when a positioning failure is not 
detected. A positioning failure is defined as a position error exceeding the 
specified Alert Limit for a particular phase of flight. In the case of designing 
a RAIM algorithm, a positioning failure is defined as a position error 
exceeding a specific maximum value, called Protection Level, which 
guarantees the required Probability of Missed Detection (Figure 1-4). A 
RAIM algorithm is an algorithm directly implemented in the user receiver 
that checks the consistency of the measurements using their redundancy. 
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Figure 1-4: An estimation of the probability of missed detection can be made as the product 
of the cumulative test statistic (P1) and navigation system error distributions (P2) 
 
For a RAIM algorithm, an estimation of the probability of missed detection 
can be made as the product of a cumulative test statistic and navigation 
system error distributions: 
 
𝑃𝑚𝑑 = Pr 𝑉𝑃𝐿 < 𝑉𝑃𝐸 ⋅ Pr⁡(𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡 < 𝑇𝑕𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑕𝑜𝑙𝑑) 
Eq. 1-17 
 
In Eq. 1-17 the first term represents the probability that the actual position 
error is greater than the computed protection level: this probability is 
normally distributed with mean equal to the magnitude of the bias affecting 
the failed satellite and with standard deviation given by Eq. 1-6 and Eq. 1-7 
for the vertical and horizontal case respectively. 
The second term of Eq. 1-17 represents the probability that the test statistic 
is below a certain threshold: this probability is characterized by a central 
chi-square distribution with n-m degrees of freedom, where n is the number 
of available measurements and m the number of unknowns (i.e., 4 for a 
single constellation, 5 for a dual constellation). 
 
A Missed Detection can lead to a Missed Alert if the positioning failure is 
not announced within the Time To Alert. The Probability of having a 
Missed Alert is called Integrity Risk. From the point of view of the user, the 
Missed Alert corresponds to a Misleading Information if the position error is 
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larger than the Protection Level, but lower than the Alert Limit and to a 
Hazardously Misleading Information if the position error is larger than both 
the Protection Level and the Alert Limit, being PL<AL. In the last case, the 
Integrity Risk is also known as Probability of Hazardously Misleading 
Information (Figure 1-5). 
 
 
Figure 1-5: Protection Level vs. Position Error 
 
In general, the allocated Integrity Risk is given by: 
 
𝐼𝑅 =  𝑝𝑛𝑃𝑚𝑑 ,𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
 
Eq. 1-18 
 
where pn is the individual failure probability for each satellite, Pmd,n is the 
allocated probability of missed detection for each satellite integrity failure 
and N is the number of used satellites. An integrity failure is a failure in the 
system other than the nominal ones, which are known to the system and to 
the user. In other words, an integrity failure is a failure that leads to an HMI 
event. 
 
It is usually assumed that the probability of individual satellite failure and 
the probability of missed detection are constant for each satellite. Moreover, 
in a conventional scheme it is usually assumed than only one satellite can 
fail.  
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Therefore, 
  
𝑃𝑚𝑑 =
𝐼𝑅
𝑁 ∙ 𝑝
=
𝐼𝑅
𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙
 
Eq. 1-19 
 
This means that the Integrity Risk is equally allocated among different 
satellites. It is now possible to derive the values of probability of missed 
detection using the value of the probability of failure and the integrity risk 
requirement described in the previous sections for non precision approach. 
Therefore, the maximum allowable probability of missed detection for NPA 
is: 
 
𝑃𝑚𝑑 =
1 × 10−7/𝑕
1 × 10−4/𝑕
= 1 × 10−3/𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 
Eq. 1-20 
 
This value applies also to precision approach, where the probability of 
failure and the integrity risk are defined per approach (i.e., 150 seconds), 
because during an approach there is only one independent sample. 
It should be noted that, even if the probability of having two independent 
simultaneous failures is very small, the case of multiple failures affecting 
the system should be taken into account when computing the probability of 
missed detection. However, in this study, even in presence of multiple 
failures, the same value for the probability of missed detection considered in 
the case of single failure will be conservatively used. 
 
Parameter Recommended value 
Maximum Allowable Probability of 
Missed Detection 
GPS satellites 
 
10-3/sample 
Table 1-4: Maximum Allowable Probability of Missed Detection for GPS 
1.3.3 Probability of False Alarms 
A false alarm is defined as the indication of a positioning failure when a 
positioning failure has not occurred. On the other hand, a true alarm is 
defined as the indication of a positioning failure when a positioning failure 
has occurred. 
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An alarm, true or false, has always an impact on the continuity of the 
system. Thus, the continuity budget should be partitioned between false 
alarms and true alarms.  
However, for En-route to NPA, the continuity requirement is usually 
entirely allocated to the false alarm rate occurring in absence of failures 
[18]. 
Following this approach, the required Probability of False Alarm is defined 
by means of Continuity Risk and Correlation Time: 
 
𝑃𝑓𝑎 = 𝐶𝑅 ∙ 𝐶𝑇 
Eq. 1-21 
 
or equivalently: 
 
𝑃𝑓𝑎 =
𝐶𝑅
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠
 
Eq. 1-22 
 
The Continuity Risk for En-route to NPA ranges between 1x10
-4
/h and 
1x10
-8
/h. The lower value is the minimum requirement for areas with low 
traffic density and airspace complexity. The higher value given is 
appropriate for areas with high traffic density and airspace complexity. 
The correlation time of the errors is assumed to be 2 minutes, which is the 
smoothing time constant of the receiver noise [23]. 
The common used value for the probability of false alarm for En-route to 
NPA is 3.33x10
-7 
per sample, as recommended also in MOPS. 
 
For precision approach, it is recommended to allocate half of the continuity 
risk budget to false alarms. Moreover, in this case the continuity risk 
requirement is defined over an exposure time of 15 seconds and there is 
only one independent sample during an approach. Therefore the value to be 
considered is now 4x10
-6
/sample [17]. 
 
Parameter Recommended value 
Probability of False Alarm 
GPS satellites 
En-route to NPA 
3.33x10-7/sample 
Probability of False Alarm 
GPS satellites 
Precision Approach 
4x10-6/sample 
Table 1-5: Recommended value for Probability of False Alarm for GPS satellites 
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Chapter 2  
The Integrity Concept 
n the previous chapter, the integrity concept from the user point of view 
was introduced. In particular, integrity requirements for specific civil 
aviation applications were described. Now, in this chapter, the integrity 
concept from the point of view of a navigation system will be introduced.  
Therefore, it will be described how a navigation system is able to satisfy the 
integrity requirements for a specific application. 
Three different concepts will be discussed: the integrity provided to the user 
by an augmented GPS system, such as SBAS, that includes a ground 
network together with geostationary satellites; the integrity autonomously 
provided by the user receiver through specific algorithms (RAIM); the 
integrity that the new Galileo system will be able to provide to the user.  
The three concepts will be here described together with their respective 
mathematical models. 
2.1 GPS/SBAS Integrity Concept 
2.1.1 Overview 
The current GPS system is neither accurate nor reliable enough to be 
accepted as a sole means of navigation. One of the reasons is that there is no 
reliable and quick (within seconds) information to the user if problems with 
the system occur. As a consequence, for landing approaches, GPS can‟t be 
used. Airplanes still have to use ILS-systems (Instrument Landing Systems) 
if visibility is poor. But the installation and maintenance of ILS-systems on 
every airport is expensive. With the SBAS (Satellite Based Augmentation 
Systems) systems, CAT I approaches (limited visibility) will be possible 
without additional ILS systems. For CAT III approaches (zero visibility) 
even the SBAS will not suffice and ILS are still required. 
 
I 
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2.1.2 SBAS Architecture 
SBAS is the ICAO term for what is also commonly known as the Wide 
Area Augmentation System or WAAS. With this system the correction 
information is collected from a network of GPS reference stations which are 
located throughout the country. Since their positions are exactly known, the 
reference stations correct any measurement errors from the satellites for 
their area. Correction information from each reference station is gathered 
and linked to a master station where it is analysed together with local 
tropospheric as well as ionospheric information. This is then sent via a geo-
stationary satellite communications link, currently provided by Inmarsat 
satellites, to an SBAS receiver on board the aircraft. This correction 
information is then used to amend the position derived from the signals 
received directly from the GNSS constellation resulting in increased 
positional accuracy of the aircraft up to better than 10 metres or up to Cat I 
precision. The Inmarsat communications satellites also act as additional 
navigation satellites for the aircraft. 
Other wide area augmentation systems similar to the U.S. WAAS have been 
developed by Europe and Japan: the European Global Navigation Overlay 
System (EGNOS) and the Multi-function Transport Satellite System 
(MSAS) for wide area navigation in the Asia and Pacific region. 
WAAS, EGNOS and MSAS have been developed to increase the safety for 
aviation. 
 
 
Figure 2-1: SBAS Architecture 
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2.1.3 SBAS Protection Levels 
The protection level is an estimation of the maximum position error that the 
user is allowed to have within a given probability of not detecting a position 
error greater than the protection level itself. It is computed by the user 
receiver, it is defined in the vertical and horizontal planes and it is compared 
with the corresponding alert limit. When the protection level is greater than 
the alert limit, an alarm should be raised by the system, which is then 
declared unavailable to perform the intended critical operation.  
The protection level concept is based on a fixed allocation of vertical and 
horizontal alert limits. Since user receiver geometries, which lead to high 
Horizontal Protection Level, are different from those that lead to high 
Vertical Protection Level values, an optimized fixed splitting cannot be 
selected for each user receiver and each location. Therefore, in the case of 
SBAS, considering that the vertical alert limit is the dominant requirement, 
a fixed allocation of the Integrity Risk has been specified accordingly, with 
98% to the vertical case and 2% to the horizontal case. On the other hand, 
RAIM allocates the entire Integrity Risk to the horizontal or the vertical 
plane, according to the specific application. For example, RAIM allocates 
the entire IR to the horizontal plane for NPA, while the entire IR to the 
vertical plane for LPV-200. 
 
According to RTCA-MOPS [9], the equipment shall use the following 
equations to calculate protection levels: 
 
𝐻𝑃𝐿𝑆𝐵𝐴𝑆 =  
𝑘𝐻,𝑁𝑃𝐴 ∙ 𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟                            (en-route to LNAV)
𝑘𝐻,𝑃𝐴  ∙  𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟   (LNAV/VNAV, LP, LPV approach)
  
Eq. 2-1 
 
𝑉𝑃𝐿𝑆𝐵𝐴𝑆 = 𝑘𝑉 ∙ 𝑑𝑈  
Eq. 2-2 
where: 
𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 =  
𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡
2 + 𝑑𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑕
2
2
+  
𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡
2 −𝑑𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑕
2
2
+ 𝑑𝐸𝑁
2  : is the error uncertainty 
along the semi-major axis of the error ellipse 
 
𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡
2 =   𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 ,𝑖
2 𝜍𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1  : is the variance of model distribution that 
overbounds the true error distribution in the east axis 
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𝑑𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑕
2 =  𝑠𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑕 ,𝑖
2 𝜍𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1  : is the variance of model distribution that 
overbounds the true error distribution   in the north axis 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑁 =  𝑠 𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 ,𝑖  𝑠𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑕 ,𝑖  𝜍𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 : is the covariance of model distribution in 
the east and north axis 
 
𝑑𝑈
2 =  𝑠𝑈,𝑖
2  𝜍𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1  : is the variance of model distribution that overbounds the 
true error distribution   in the vertical axis 
 
𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 ,𝑖  is the partial derivative of position error in the east direction 
𝑠𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑕 ,𝑖  is the partial derivative of position error in the north direction 
𝑠𝑈,𝑖  is the partial derivative of position error in the vertical direction 
 
𝜍𝑖
2 = 𝜍𝑖 ,𝑓𝑙𝑡
2 + 𝜍𝑖 ,𝑈𝐼𝑅𝐸
2 + 𝜍𝑖,𝑎𝑖𝑟
2 + 𝜍𝑖 ,𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜
2  
Eq. 2-3 
 
For a general least squares position solution, the projection matrix S is 
defined as: 
 
 
𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 ,1 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 ,2 ⋯ 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 ,𝑁
𝑠𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑕 ,1 𝑠𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑕 ,2 ⋯ 𝑠𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑕 ,𝑁
𝑠𝑈,1 𝑠𝑈,2 ⋯ 𝑠𝑈,𝑁
𝑠𝑡 ,1 𝑠𝑡 ,2 ⋯ 𝑠𝑡,𝑁
 =  𝐆𝑇 ∙ 𝐖 ∙ 𝑮 −1 ∙ 𝑮𝑇 ∙ 𝑾   
 
 
with: 
 
𝐺𝑖 = [−𝑐𝑜𝑠𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑧𝑖 −𝑐𝑜𝑠𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑠𝐴𝑧𝑖 −𝑠𝑖𝑛𝐸𝑙𝑖 1]  (where the positive 
azimuth is defined clockwise from North) 
 
𝑤𝑖 = 1/𝜍𝑖
2 
 
kH,NPA=6.18 (en-route to LNAV) 
kH,PA=6.0 (LNAV/VNAV, LP, LPV) 
kV=5.33 
 
The choice of k value is somewhat arbitrary: the fundamental underlying 
requirement is that SBAS service providers must send UDREs and GIVEs 
such that the values of HPLSBAS and VPLSBAS bound their respective errors 
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with target probabilities. However, [10] suggests a rationale to calculate k 
values: k is determined from a Rayleigh distribution for En route to NPA 
applications since the protection has to be bi-dimensional. For APV-I, II and 
CAT-I applications, two uni-dimensional k factors are determined from a 
Normal distribution corresponding to the lateral (cross-track) and vertical 
protections. K may be directly calculated from the knowledge of the 
cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the relevant statistical law. 
Therefore, the previous k values are calculated using a decorrelation time of 
360 seconds and using the integrity risk requirements for NPA and for 
APV-I, II and CAT-I. 
For en-route to LNAV approach, HPLSBAS must bound horizontal radial 
error with a probability of 1-10
-7
 per hour, i.e., the probability that 
horizontal radial position error exceeds HPLSBAS must not exceed 10
-7
 in 
any hour, except possibly for brief periods less than the time to alert. For 
LNAV/VNAV, LP and LPV approaches, the probability that horizontal 
cross-track error or vertical error or both exceed their respective protection 
levels must not exceed 2x10
-7
 per approach. Only one dimension is used for 
HPLSBAS in LNAV/VNAV, LP and LPV approaches, since the along-track 
tolerance is so much larger than the cross-track. The worst case dimension is 
used. For vertical approach, RTCA has allocated 98% of the Integrity Risk 
and used the inverse cdf of a Gaussian distribution to find kV. 
2.2 RAIM 
2.2.1 Overview 
The integrity of a navigation system can be checked by using external 
systems such as SBAS to monitor the correctness of the signals used for 
position calculation. One major drawback of this approach is the inherent 
delay that is introduced in the detection of an error, due to the time it takes 
to uplink information on errors. This section will focus on internal 
monitoring, and in particular on RAIM. RAIM stands for Receiver 
Autonomous Integrity Monitoring and it is used to denote monitoring 
algorithm that uses nothing but the measurements of one particular 
navigation subsystem, usually a GPS receiver. Conventional RAIM 
algorithms are designed to protect user from a single satellite failure at a 
time. However, recent developments have shown RAIM potentiality to 
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provide integrity even in case of multiple failures for demanding flight 
categories as LPV-200 and APV-II.  
Measurement information is used to compute a position. Some test statistic 
is derived from this position computation and is fed to an error detector that 
will warn the user when something is wrong. The error detection 
performance will have to obey the navigation requirements and it is 
important to determine the detection power (or „error detectability‟) that 
depends on the measurement quality and configuration. It is in fact this 
detection power computation that monitors the system integrity, as it 
determines whether the system has the ability to provide timely warnings 
when the system is in error. If this is not the case, it will inform the user that 
using the system might be unsafe. It should be noted that position 
computation algorithms always assume that noise on the measurements has 
a zero mean. An error or bias - as it is commonly called - is therefore 
defined as the non-zero mean of measurement noise. 
2.2.2 Satellite Slope 
The slope, which relates the induced position error to the test statistic, can 
be calculated directly from geometry and it is different for each satellite. 
The satellite with the largest slope is the one that is the most difficult to 
detect and it produces the largest position error for a given test statistic 
(Figure 2-2). 
 
 
 
 
Slope is a geometry parameter and it can be directly computed from the 
specific satellite-user geometry, according to the following equations in the 
horizontal and vertical planes respectively: 
 
P
o
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Test Statistic 
Max Slope 
Figure 2-2: Satellite Slope 
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𝐻𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑖 =
 𝐾1𝑖
2 + 𝐾2𝑖
2 𝜍𝑖
 1 − 𝑃𝑖𝑖
 
Eq. 2-4 
 
𝑉𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑖 =
 𝐾3𝑖 𝜍𝑖
 1 − 𝑃𝑖𝑖
 
Eq. 2-5 
 
where 𝑲 =  𝐆𝑇 ∙ 𝐖 ∙ 𝑮 −1 ∙ 𝑮𝑇 ∙ 𝑾 is the weighted pseudo-inverse of the 
design matrix, being W the inverse of the covariance matrix, while 𝑷 = 𝑮 ⋅
𝑲. The geometry contribution to the slope is given by the K and P matrices. 
 
A different slope concept has to be introduced when dealing with dual 
failure. The least detectable pair of satellites is given by the pair of satellite 
whose combination leads to the largest position error for a given test 
statistic. It has to be noted that the worst pair of satellites is not necessarily 
given by the two satellites which have the highest individual slopes, because 
the combined slope could have a different value. 
Three methods to calculate dual failure slope have been considered: the 
relevant equations are not reported here for brevity, but they can be found in 
([14], [15] and [16]). All methods lead to quite similar results: as expected, 
the highest slope in the dual failure case is larger than the highest slope in 
the single failure case. Therefore, the protection level in the dual failure case 
has to be inflated in order to protect the user and still satisfy the required 
probability of missed detection. However, it should be noted that in case of 
dual constellation and dual failure, the slope equations have to be slightly 
modified in order to include also data from the other constellation. 
2.2.3 The least detectable satellite 
The satellite with the highest slope is the least detectable satellite, as it is 
this satellite that (in the noiseless case) has the worst ratio of position error 
to test statistic size. There is no reason why it should always be the least 
detectable satellite that fails, and it should be clear that assuming this leads 
to an overestimation of PHMI and an underestimation of RAIM availability. 
Still, the assumption is widely used and applied, since it is a conservative 
assumption. 
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2.2.4 RAIM Protection Levels 
There are two main methods to calculate protection levels for a RAIM 
algorithm. These two methods lead to slightly different results. Therefore it 
is important to find out which one is the best choice for the specific 
application. Both methods consider the slope of the least detectable satellite, 
which is assumed to one that has a failure. 
One way to calculate Protection Levels in the vertical and horizontal planes 
is described in [25] and it uses the following equations for the vertical and 
horizontal cases respectively: 
 
𝑉𝑃𝐿𝐹𝐷 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑉𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒  𝑇 𝑁, 𝑃𝑓𝑎  + 𝑘 𝑃𝑚𝑑  𝜍𝑉  
Eq. 2-6 
 
𝐻𝑃𝐿𝐹𝐷 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐻𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒  𝑇 𝑁, 𝑃𝑓𝑎  + 𝑘 𝑃𝑚𝑑  𝜍𝐻 
Eq. 2-7 
 
where: 
 Vslope and Hslope are the satellite error slope in the vertical and 
horizontal planes 
 T(N,Pfa) is the test statistic threshold and it is a function of the 
number of satellites (N) and the desired probability of false alarm 
(Pfa). Given the probability of false alarms, the threshold is found by 
inverting the incomplete gamma function: 
 
1 − 𝑃𝑓𝑎 =
1
Γ 𝑎 
 𝑒−𝑠𝑠𝑎−1𝑑𝑠 
𝑇2
0
 
 
where a is the number of degrees of freedom divided by two, or in 
terms of the number of measurements N and unknowns M:  
 
𝑎 =
𝑁 − 𝑀
2
 
 
 k(PMD) is the number of standard deviations corresponding to the 
specified Probability of Missed Detection. The smaller the PMD 
value, the higher the number of standard deviations should be 
considered, since longer tails for the Gaussian distribution should be 
taken into account. 
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 𝜍𝑉  and 𝜍𝐻 are the standard deviations of the error in the position 
domain in the vertical and horizontal plane 
 
It should be noted that when using RAIM it is common to allocate the whole 
Integrity Risk and so the whole Pmd to only one plane (vertical or horizontal) 
according to the specific operation. For example, for LPV-200, the whole 
Integrity Risk is allocated to the vertical domain, being this one the most 
demanding requirement. 
Another method to calculate protection level is described in [11] and it still 
considers the slope concept, but using different equations: 
 
𝑉𝑃𝐿 = 𝑉𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥 ⋅ 𝑝𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝐵 
Eq. 2-8 
 
𝐻𝑃𝐿 = 𝐻𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥 ⋅ 𝑝𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝐵 
Eq. 2-9 
 
where Vslopemax and Hslopemax are again the maximum slopes in the 
vertical and horizontal plane, while pbiasB denotes the particular pbias 
required to force the data cloud to be such that the no-detection probability 
is equal to the required value in the test statistic domain. Pbias is a general 
term for the bias component of satellite range error referred to parity space: 
more specifically, it will always mean the magnitude of the deterministic 
bias component. Therefore, the parity vector can be written as 𝒑 =
𝒑𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 + 𝒑𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒  and so 𝑝𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 =  𝒑𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐  . PbiasB can be 
computed as the square root of the non-centrality parameter 𝜆 of the chi-
square distribution of the test statistic.  
This second method usually provides a larger protection level than the first 
method. This can be worse in terms of accuracy, but better in terms of 
required probability of missed detection. However, for very good 
geometries, the pbias concept can underestimate the true position error, 
leading to less conservative values of the protection level, which could 
eventually not satisfy the required probability of missed detection. 
Therefore, the choice of the best method to use strongly depends on the 
specific application. 
It should be noted that pbiasB is normalized to the 𝜍 value, because the slope 
is computed by multiplying the geometry factor by 𝜍. 
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For both methods, in case of dual failure single failure slopes should be 
substituted by dual failure slopes, as described in the previous section. In 
this case, a larger value for protection level will be found. 
2.2.5 RAIM Test Statistic 
It is not possible to obtain a direct measurement of the position error. 
Therefore, the overall consistency of the solution has to be investigated. 
Provided there are more than four measurements, the system is 
overdetermined and cannot be solved exactly. This is why a least squares 
solution is performed in the first place. Since all of the conditions 
realistically cannot be met exactly, there is a remaining error residual to the 
fit. Therefore, an estimate of the goodness of the fit is required, with the 
assumption that if the fit was good, the error in position is most likely small.  
An estimate of the ranging errors from the least squares fit and the basic 
measurement equation is given by [25]: 
 
𝝐𝒘𝒍𝒔 = 𝒚 − 𝑮 ⋅ 𝒙𝒘𝒍𝒔 =  𝑰 − 𝑮 ⋅ 𝑲 ⋅ 𝒚 =  𝑰 − 𝑷 ⋅ 𝒚 
Eq. 2-10 
  
where: 
 
𝑷 = 𝑮 ⋅ 𝑲 = 𝑮 ⋅  𝑮𝑻 ⋅ 𝑾 ⋅ 𝑮 −1 ⋅ 𝑮𝑻 ⋅ 𝑾 
Eq. 2-11 
  
From these error estimates it is possible to define a scalar measure defined 
as the Weighted Sum of the Squared Errors (WSSE): 
 
𝑊𝑆𝑆𝐸 = 𝝐𝒘𝒍𝒔
𝑻 ⋅ 𝑾 ⋅ 𝝐𝒘𝒍𝒔 =   𝑰 − 𝑷 ⋅ 𝒚 
𝑇 ⋅ 𝑾 ⋅ [ 𝑰 − 𝑷 ⋅ 𝒚] 
Eq. 2-12 
 
which is equivalent to: 
 
𝑊𝑆𝑆𝐸 = 𝒚𝑻 ⋅ 𝑾 ⋅  𝑰 − 𝑷 ⋅ 𝒚 
Eq. 2-13 
 
The square root of WSSE plays the role of the basic observable, because 
this yields a linear relationship between a satellite bias error and the 
associated induced test statistic.  The test statistic can be defined in both the 
horizontal and vertical planes. An alternative test statistic can be calculated 
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also in the parity space. However, it has been showed that the magnitude of 
the test statistic in the parity space is equivalent to the SSE test statistic [33]. 
Therefore, only the weighted form of the SEE test statistic (i.e., WSSE) will 
be hereafter considered as test statistic. 
 
Typically, a certain threshold, which depends on the required probability of 
false alarm, is selected. If the statistic exceeds that threshold, then the 
position fix is assumed to be unsafe. On the other hand, if the statistic is 
below the threshold, then the position fix is assumed to be valid. 
Thus, the statistic-vertical error plane is broken up into four regions 
consisting of: normal operation points, missed detections, successful 
detections and false alarms. Ideally, there would never be any missed 
detections or false alarms. In reality, a certain number of missed detections 
and false alarms are allowed, according to the Pmd and Pfa requirements 
respectively. 
 
 
Figure 2-3: RAIM in nominal conditions 
2.3 Galileo Integrity Concept 
2.3.1 Overview 
The integrity concept introduced by Galileo is innovative and has the aim to 
provide the user with a more powerful mean to check the integrity of the 
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system. Integrity concepts have been established and optimized for present 
SBAS like WAAS or EGNOS according to their required performances in 
terms of availability, integrity, and continuity. The performance 
requirements for Galileo are one order of magnitude more demanding 
compared to these present systems and therefore a new integrity concept, 
based on the established approaches, has been developed. 
For Galileo a variety of user applications needs to be satisfied and neither 
the vertical nor the horizontal case is dominating. A combined integrity risk 
value is specified in the Galileo system requirements accordingly. For 
Galileo a ten times more stringent availability requirement compared to 
WAAS is specified (0.5% vs. 5% unavailability) and that the impact of a 
fixed split on the availability cannot be neglected. Thus, for Galileo the 
integrity risk is directly calculated at the Alert Limit and the result has to be 
below the specified Integrity Risk, which depends on the specific 
application. In this way, a not fixed allocation of the Integrity Risk is 
considered for Galileo. It has been shown in [12] that a fixed splitting is 
possible for availability requirements equal or below 95% but not for higher 
performance specifications up to 99.5% as it is required for Galileo. 
The Galileo Integrity Risk computation algorithm will be part of the Galileo 
Safety-of-Life (SoL) service, which will add Integrity to the Galileo Open 
Service (OS). It is not clear yet is SoL service will be freely available to 
every user and when will be finally deployed, since OS has now the priority. 
2.3.2 Galileo Ground Segment 
Beside the global satellite network consisting of 27 satellites (plus three in-
active spares) Galileo has the capability to monitor the satellite behaviour 
through its complex global distributed ground network consisting of more 
than 30 sensor stations. Taking these measurements into account satellite 
failures (orbit or clock) can be detected and alerts can be disseminated to the 
user. 
The system takes care of always monitoring the constellation and to transmit 
in broadcast to the user information about the health status of each satellite 
through a three states flag (Integrity Flag) related to each satellite. The 
monitoring process is realised by a stations network (GSS stations) located 
all around the globe. This network carries out pseudorange measurements 
from every satellite and, through an inverse navigation algorithm, estimates 
the pseudorange error relevant to each satellite (SISE: Signal In Space 
Error). The estimation (estimated-SISE) carried out represents the range 
error contribution due to the satellite contribution, which impact on the user 
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solution. This estimation process unfortunately introduces another error that 
in the Galileo Integrity Concept has been assumed, according to an 
overbounding process, Gaussian with zero mean value. 
2.3.3 Galileo Integrity equation 
2.3.3.1 Definitions 
The system supplies to the user three parameters related to each satellite of 
the Galileo constellation: 
 
 SISA (Signal In Space Accuracy), defined as the minimum standard 
deviation of the unbiased Gaussian distribution which overbounds 
the distribution of the SISE 
 SISMA (Signal In Space Monitoring Accuracy), defined as the 
minimum standard deviation of the unbiased Gaussian distribution 
which overbounds the error distribution of the estimation of SISE as 
determined by the integrity monitoring system 
 IF (Integrity Flag), a three states flag (“Use”/“Don‟t Use”/“Not 
Monitored”) which describes the satellite health status. 
 
Through this information the user receiver is able to run the HPCA (HMI 
Probability Computation Algorithm) and to carry out the integrity and 
continuity performances. So, to finally decide if a critical operation can be 
started, the user has to calculate its local Integrity Risk through the HPCA. 
 
Both SISA and SISMA are conservatively defined at the worst user location 
(WUL), which is the location where the Signal in Space error (SISE) is 
maximum. 
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Figure 2-4: Graphical illustration of SISA and SISMA 
 
The SISE is assumed to be a Gaussian distribution. In particular the 
distribution of the SISE is, in case of fault-free and single failure, 
respectively: 
 
𝑃𝑥 𝑥 =
1
 2𝜋 ⋅ 𝑆𝐼𝑆𝐴
𝑒−
1
2
 
𝑥
𝑆𝐼𝑆𝐴 
2
   
Eq. 2-14 
 
𝑃𝑥 𝑥 =
1
 2𝜋 ⋅ 𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑀𝐴
𝑒−
1
2
 
𝑥−𝑇𝐻
𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑀𝐴 
2
   
Eq. 2-15 
 
Therefore: 
 
SISE~N(0,SISA)   fault-free 
SISE~N(TH,SISMA)   faulty-mode (single failure) 
 
where TH represents a conservative estimation of the bias magnitude in the 
faulty-mode. 
 
Nominal values for SISA and SISMA have been assessed to be 0.85 meters 
and 0.70 meters respectively [30]. However, these values could be increased 
in case of degradations in the Ground Segment or in the signal. 
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2.3.3.2 Integrity at the User level 
The integrity at user level is carried out by the receiver in terms of HMI 
probability, which depends on the user constellation geometry (after 
excluding all the satellites with flag “Don‟t Use”), on the SISA value (used 
to model the SISE in fault-free conditions), on the SISMA value (for 
modelling the error in case of single failure), and of course it is a function of 
the receiver error too. 
 
The HMI probability is composed of two parts. The first one takes into 
account the scenario in which all the satellites of the constellation with flag 
“Use” are transmitting correct signals (Fault-Free). The second one 
considers the possibility that one satellite with flag “Use” is failed (Faulty-
Mode). Both these two terms are divided in a horizontal and in a vertical 
component. 
The probability that more than one satellite at each instance in time is faulty 
but not detected is negligible for the user equation. Multiple and common 
failures are allocated in another branch of the integrity tree including not 
detected SISA and SISMA failures. Therefore these events are not allocated 
to the user integrity equation. The combined user integrity risk is then 
computed using the following equation [13]: 
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Eq. 2-16 
 
where: 
 
for the vertical case with the error function: 
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and for the horizontal case with the cumulative distribution function of the 
non-central Chi-Squared distribution with two degrees of freedom (with 
non-centrality parameter  ) 
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The further needed fault-free and faulty vertical standard deviations can be 
computed by (Mtopo is the typical topocentric weighted design matrix used 
for least squares position estimation): 
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respectively for the horizontal case by 
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where the index j indicates the faulty satellite. 
 
The biases bj at the thresholds THj (bj=THj) are taken into account by 
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and with it the non-centrality parameter   
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The threshold THj for satellite j can be easily computed by the disseminated 
integrity information SISAj and SISMAj for that satellite and the allowed 
false alert probability kPfa (typical kPfa = 5.212): 
 
𝑇𝐻𝑗 = 𝑘𝑃𝑓𝑎 ⋅  𝑆𝐼𝑆𝐴𝑗
2 + 𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑗
2 
Eq. 2-17 
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Considering the nominal values for SISA and SISMA, the previous equation 
gives a value of 5 meters. Therefore, the faulty-case foresees an undetected 
bias, whose typical magnitude is 5 meters, that affects the SISE estimation 
process. This means that, if the HMI Probability is below the Integrity Risk 
requirement, the user is protected even in case of an undetected failure on 
one satellite with a maximum magnitude of 5 meters. On the other hand, 
biases with greater magnitude are more likely to be detected by the Ground 
Segment, but they could be undetected in case of larger, degraded values of 
SISA and SISMA. 
 
If the HMI probability exceeds the Integrity Risk allocated at user level, the 
receiver generates an alert in order to stop immediately the current critical 
operation. 
 
The continuity performances are carried out by counting the number of 
critical satellites present in the current user geometry. This means that the 
receiver has to run N times (where N is the number of satellite in visibility 
with Integrity Flag “Use”) the HPCA algorithm and takes care to number 
how many geometries lead to a HMI probability exceeding the specified 
threshold. When the number of critical satellites is over a certain threshold 
specified at system level, it is equivalent to say that the Discontinuity Risk 
exceeds the specified value and the requirements are not met. In this case 
the receiver has to timely warn the user. A critical satellite is defined as a 
satellite in the current user geometry whose loss or exclusion will 
unconditionally lead to exceed the tolerated HMI probability threshold in 
any integrity critical operation period. 
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Chapter 3  
GPS integrity applications: GPS with 
RAIM algorithms 
alileo will be able to provide the integrity service in a stand-alone 
configuration, while current GPS needs augmentation systems such as 
SBAS or performing autonomous monitoring of the integrity through RAIM 
algorithms. 
Two analyses have been carried out in this work in order to verify the 
performance of the current integrity implementations for GPS in 
combination with the European SBAS system, EGNOS, and with RAIM 
algorithms. In this way, the current integrity concept has been exploited and 
this study represents a good starting point for possible future developments 
in the new Galileo integrity concept. 
The analysis that will be described in this chapter aims to explore RAIM 
potentiality to provide integrity at the user level without a complex and high 
cost ground segment and a simple implementation. This analysis will be 
performed for precision approach applications. Therefore, LPV-200 
requirements will be considered. This analysis will then be extended in the 
last chapter to include also the Galileo system. 
3.1 Overview of the analysis 
This analysis deals with the simplest method to provide integrity using a 
GPS system in combination with autonomous user integrity algorithms. In 
presence of a failure, the RAIM algorithm should be able to raise an alarm 
in order to warn the user that the computed position is not safe for the 
specific application. This is done by properly setting the Protection Level 
and the test statistic. A RAIM is designed to satisfy the required probability 
of missed detection, therefore a certain number of missed detections are 
allowed. 
G 
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Several methods to calculate protection level will be considered. The 
common base-line as well as the algorithm flow-chart are shown in the next 
two pictures. It should be noted that only the vertical case will be 
considered, because for precision approaches the vertical requirement is 
more stringent than the horizontal one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1: GPS+RAIM algorithm base-line 
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Figure 3-2: GPS+RAIM algorithm flow-chart 
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In the following tests, several geometries using a fixed receiver and different 
satellite positions will be considered. Geometries are computed from GPS 
Almanacs at different epochs and for different positions of the receiver on 
the Earth. However, in the following sections only results for a single 
specific geometry will be shown with several RAIM algorithms in different 
conditions: nominal (no failures), single failure and dual failures. Several 
software modules have been developed in order to get data from GPS 
almanacs and to calculate the relevant parameters for testing RAIM 
algorithms. However, the whole software will be deeply described in 
chapter 5, since the modules that are used in this section are just a small part 
of the complete software that has been developed. 
 
In order to have a statistically significant level of confidence, a large 
number of Monte-Carlo trials should be performed for each geometry. 
Indeed, the number of trials that are needed to satisfy the required 
confidence level and margin of error are given by [22]: 
 
𝑛 =  
𝑧
2𝑒
 
2
 
Eq. 3-1 
 
Where n is the number of trails, z is a factor that depends on the confidence 
level, e is the margin of error. The following table contains values of z for 
some common confidence levels: 
 
Confidence 
Level 
z 
95% 1.96 
99% 2.58 
99.9% 3.29 
Table 3-1: Values of z factor for some common confidence levels 
 
Therefore, for a confidence level of 99% and a margin of error of 5% on a 
Probability of Missed Detection equal to 10
-3
, the total number of trials per 
geometry should be: 
 
 
3.29
2 × 0.00005
 
2
= 1,082,410,000 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦 
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Due to the high computational load, the number of trials has been reduced to 
250000. This number comes out from several independent tests that have 
been successfully performed. Thus, in order to satisfy the probability of 
missed detection of 10
-3
/sample, the maximum number of position errors 
exceeding the protection level should be equal to or less than 250. By 
counting the number of missed detections over all the random trials it is 
possible to know the probability of missed detections for the specific 
geometry and compare it with the required value. The computed Pmd is then 
compared with the theoretical value given by the following expression: 
 
𝑃𝑚𝑑 = Pr 𝑉𝑃𝐿 < 𝑉𝑃𝐸 ⋅ Pr(𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡 < 𝑇𝑕𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑕𝑜𝑙𝑑) 
Eq. 3-2 
 
It is expected that the computed Pmd is very close to the theoretical value, 
even if the number of Monte Carlo trials that are performed is less than 
required for a confidence level of 99% and a margin of error of 5%. 
 
The general test conditions are summarised in the next table. 
 
General Test Conditions Single Constellation 
GPS Almanac 012.AL3 (SEM format) 2008 
GPS week 1462 
GPS seconds of the week 157456 
Probability of Missed Detection 1x10
-3
/sample 
Probability of False Alarm 4x10
-6
/sample 
UERE Values depend on elevation angles 
Noise ~N(0,UERE) 
Mask angle 5 degrees 
Receiver position (ECEF 
coordinates) 
[1767224.327927657,  
5373526.074516900, 
2937637.435886630] meters 
Number of random trials 250,000 
Vertical Alert Limit 35m (LPV-200) 
Table 3-2: General test conditions for testing RAIM algorithms (single constellation) 
 
On the other hand, GPS UERE values were computed from the following 
look-up table. These values, which depend on elevation angles, were 
obtained from independent tests and analyses and could be overly 
conservative. Indeed, smaller UERE values are expected for modernised 
GPS. 
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GPS UERE budget 
 Elevation angle (deg) 
UERE 
(m) 
0 5 10 15 20 30 40 50 60 90.1 
1.9 1.9 1.36 1.15 1.04 0.96 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.91 
Table 3-3: GPS UERE values 
3.2 Worst Case Bias 
The worst case bias (WCB) is the bias that maximises the missed detection 
probability (Figure 3-3). In case of dual failure, the worst case couple of 
biases can be defined in the same manner. 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3: Worst Case Bias 
 
In the following tests, for the single failure case, it will be conservatively 
assumed that the worst case bias is affecting the least detectable satellite. On 
the other hand, in the dual failure cases it is assumed that the worst pair of 
bias is affecting the least detectable pair of satellites. In both cases, the 
worst case biases can be found numerically, by calculating for each bias or 
pair of biases the resulting Pmd, with bias values ranging from -20 to 20 
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metres. However, in the dual failure case this could be computationally 
involved. Therefore, in the dual failure case the search of the worst pair of 
biases is restricted to the pairs whose ratio kbias is given by [16]: 
 
𝑘 = 𝑘 𝑖, 𝑗 =
𝑏𝑖
𝑏𝑗
=
𝐴3𝑖𝑈𝑗𝑗 − 𝐴3𝑗 𝑈𝑖𝑗
𝐴3𝑗 𝑈𝑖𝑖 − 𝐴3𝑖𝑈𝑖𝑗
 
Eq. 3-3 
 
where: 
 
 
𝐴 =  𝐺𝑇𝐺 −1𝐺𝑇
𝐵 = 𝐺 𝐺𝑇𝐺 −1𝐺𝑇
𝑈 = 𝐼𝑛 − 𝐵
  
 
In this way for each couple of satellites only the pair of biases whose 
combination maximises the position error is considered. 
3.3 Nominal conditions: no failures 
When all satellites are behaving nominally, the error ellipse should ideally 
be in the nominal operations region, even if a certain number of false alarms 
are allowed, according to the required probability of false alarm. In order to 
be statistically accurate, this test should consider a number of trials much 
larger than 250,000. In this way it is possible to accommodate the required 
probability of false alarm. However, since in this framework it is important 
to test RAIM capability to detect satellite failures, this analysis is not 
relevant at the moment and will be neglected. 
The next picture shows the RAIM nominal behaviour with 250,000 random 
trials under the same test conditions that will be adopted for the single 
failure case (Table 3-2 and Table 3-3), but with no failures and considering 
only one method to calculate the protection level (i.e., Stanford VPL). 
As expected, the error ellipse is in the “Normal Operations” region and the 
Pfa requirement is satisfied. However, as stated before, this result for the 
false alarm rate is not accurate, since a higher number of random trials 
would be required to confirm it. 
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Figure 3-4: RAIM in nominal conditions 
3.4 Single failure 
A single failure can be detected by a traditional RAIM algorithm by setting 
properly the protection levels. The required probability of missed detection 
should be satisfied. This means that the protection level should be computed 
in order to guarantee that the maximum position error doesn‟t exceed the 
protection level more than required by the probability of missed detection. 
Two different methods to calculate protection levels have been considered: 
the first one is the Stanford method (Eq. 2-6), while the second one uses the 
pbias concept (Eq. 2-8, Brown‟s method). In both cases it is conservatively 
assumed that the least detectable satellite (i.e., the satellite with the highest 
slope) is affected by the worst case bias (i.e., the bias that maximises the 
probability of missed detection). The worst case bias is found numerically 
running several simulations for different biases: the bias that provides the 
maximum probability of missed detection is then the worst case bias. 
 
In the next simulations, a step function representing the worst case bias is 
added to the pseudorange of the least detectable satellite. The bias is not 
added to the Signal in Space noise, but directly to the final pseudorange at 
the user level, because it has to represent a failure that has not been detected 
by the Ground Segment. The general test conditions are given in Table 3-2 
and Table 3-3, while specific simulation data are shown in the next table. 
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Simulation Data 1 failure single constellation 
Bias Worst case bias on the least 
detectable satellite 
Number of satellites in view 9 
Protection Level 1
st
 case 𝑉𝑃𝐿 = 𝑉𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑇 𝑁, 𝑃𝑓𝑎 + 𝑘 𝑃𝑚𝑑  𝜍𝑉 
Protection Level 2
nd
 case 𝑉𝑃𝐿 = 𝑉𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥 ⋅ 𝑝𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝐵 
Pmd 1
st
 case 5.12x10
-4
 (computed) / 5x10
-4
  (theoretical) 
Pmd 2
nd
 case 4x10
-6
 (computed) / 1.73x10
-6
 (theoretical) 
Table 3-4: Simulation data (single failure, single constellation) 
 
The results of the performed analysis are shown in the next figures, where 
the error ellipse is plotted for all the random trials of a selected geometry. 
As it can be seen, the ellipse is centred on the slope of the biased satellite 
and it moves along it if the bias magnitude changes. 
 
 
Figure 3-5: RAIM with a bias of -9 meters on the least detectable GPS satellite – Stanford 
VPL 
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Figure 3-6: RAIM with a bias of -9 meters on the least detectable GPS satellite – Brown’s 
VPL 
 
In both cases, the required probability of missed detection is satisfied, but 
the second method looks overly conservative in terms of probability of 
missed detection, providing a larger protection level. This could represent a 
problem in terms of availability, especially for worse geometries with fewer 
satellites in view. However, since for LPV-200 and APV-II the required 
alert limit is far above the computed value of protection level, this, in 
general, does not represent an issue for these two categories. 
Therefore, for LPV-200 and APV-II applications and in case of single 
failure on the least detectable GPS satellite, both methods are able to 
properly protect the user. On the other hand, for more demanding categories, 
such as CAT-I (VAL=10 m), the system is very close to be unavailable in 
both cases. It should also be noted that in both cases the computed value of 
the probability of missed detection (calculated by counting the number of 
missed detections over all the random trials) has the same order of 
magnitude of the analytical value obtained using Eq. 3-2. This confirms the 
statistical approach that has been used. 
3.5 Dual failure 
Traditional RAIM algorithms were not designed to detect two simultaneous 
failures. This is due to the fact that the probability of having two 
simultaneous failures on the same system is very small, as seen in the 
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previous chapters. However, it is basically possible to extend conventional 
RAIMs to the multiple failures case. This could be done by inflating the 
Protection Level in order to bound the increased position error. Indeed, in 
the dual failure cases, as shown in the previous chapter, the maximum slope 
to be considered is now the one given by the worst pair of satellites. As seen 
before, there are different techniques to calculate the dual failure slope. 
However, the problem is that, as shown in [14], this new slope is much 
larger than the highest slope in the single failure case. This means that the 
protection level is much larger now and this dramatically affects the system 
availability. 
As an example, the next figures show the results using four different 
methods: in the first one the protection level is computed using the Stanford 
method, but with the dual failure slope as given in Angus [15]; in the second 
and in the third method the dual failure slope is computed according to 
Brown [14], but in one case the VPL is computed using the Stanford 
equation and in the other using the pbiasb concept. Finally, in the fourth 
case the dual failure slope is computed following Liu [16] and using again 
the pbiab concept. As for the single failure case, it is assumed that the worst 
case biases are on the least detectable pair of satellites. The worst case pair 
of biases is found again numerically by running several simulations for 
different couple of biases whose ratio is given by Eq. 3-3. The pair of biases 
that provides the maximum probability of missed detection is the worst pair. 
In some cases the methods were slightly modified in order to include the 
weights also in the slope computation. The general test conditions are the 
same of the single failure case (Table 3-2 and Table 3-3) and the specific 
simulation data are summarised in the next table. 
 
Simulation Data 2 failures single constellation 
Bias Worst case biases on the least 
detectable pair of satellites 
Number of satellites in view 9 
Protection Level 1
st
 case 𝑉𝑃𝐿 = 𝑉𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒1𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝑇 𝑁, 𝑃𝑓𝑎 + 𝑘 𝑃𝑚𝑑  𝜍𝑉 
Protection Level 2
nd
 case 𝑉𝑃𝐿 = 𝑉𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒2𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝑇 𝑁, 𝑃𝑓𝑎  + 𝑘 𝑃𝑚𝑑  𝜍𝑉  
Protection Level 3
rd
 case 𝑉𝑃𝐿 = 𝑉𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒2𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 ⋅ 𝑝𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝐵 
Protection Level 4
th
 case 𝑉𝑃𝐿 = 𝑉𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒3𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 ⋅ 𝑝𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝐵 
Pmd 1
st
 case 1.2x10
-2
 (computed) / 1.2x10
-2
 (theoretical) 
Pmd 2
nd
 case 3.49x10
-2
 (computed) / 3.5x10
-2
 (theoretical) 
Pmd 3
rd 
case 0 (computed) / 0 (theoretical) 
Pmd 4
th
 case 0 (computed) / 0 (theoretical) 
Table 3-5: Simulation data (dual failure, single constellation) 
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Figure 3-7: RAIM in dual failure case: Angus VPL 
 
 
Figure 3-8: RAIM in dual failure case: Stanford VPL 
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Figure 3-9: RAIM in dual failure case: Brown VPL 
 
 
Figure 3-10: RAIM in dual failure case: Liu VPL 
 
As it can be seen, these schemes don‟t provide integrity. Indeed, in the first 
two methods the required probability of missed detection is not satisfied. 
The other two methods satisfy the probability of missed detection, but this is 
affecting a lot the availability, since the protection level is very close to the 
alert limit value for LPV-200.  
Also in this case, the computed values of the probability of missed detection 
are very close to the theoretical ones given by Eq. 3-2. It should also be 
noted that the method using the pbiasb concept (Brown and Liu) are again 
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more conservative than the methods using the Stanford VPL equation 
(Angus and Stanford).  
In conclusion, as expected, a RAIM algorithm with a single constellation is 
providing limited integrity in the dual failure case. 
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Chapter 4  
GPS Integrity applications: GPS with 
EGNOS 
atellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS) provides integrity to GPS 
users. The European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service 
(EGNOS) is a satellite based augmentation system (SBAS) recently 
developed by the European Space Agency, the European Commission and 
EUROCONTROL. It is intended to supplement the GPS, GLONASS and 
Galileo (when it becomes operational) systems by reporting on the 
reliability and accuracy of the signals. According to specifications, 
horizontal position accuracy should be better than 7 meters. In practice, the 
horizontal position accuracy is at the meter level. It consists of three 
geostationary satellites and a network of ground stations. The system started 
its initial operations in July 2005, being fully operational in late 2006 and 
showing outstanding performances in terms of accuracy (better than 2 
meters) and availability (above 99%); it is intended to be certified for use in 
safety of life applications in 2008. 
Similar service is provided in North America by the Wide Area 
Augmentation System (WAAS), and in Asia, notably Japan, by the Multi-
functional Satellite Augmentation System (MSAS). 
The following analysis will explore EGNOS potentiality to protect user 
from GPS satellites failures. In particular, an original technique will be here 
introduced in order to analyse the EGNOS reaction in presence of clock 
anomalies on the GPS satellites. 
4.1 Overview of the analysis 
In this section a particular scenario has been considered: during years 2006 
and 2007, the European Space Agency recorded abnormal behaviours of 
GPS satellites. Indeed, GPS satellites were affected by several clock 
anomalies and, without a proper augmentation system, the user could suffer 
S 
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of an unacceptable position error [19]. Thus, EGNOS was required to 
protect the user in terms of integrity, keeping the position error low and 
always bounded by the Protection Levels. In the next sections an original 
technique to analyse the effect of these anomalies and the EGNOS reaction 
to them in terms of integrity will be presented, including also the results. 
This work has been performed in collaboration with the Research Group of 
Astronomy and Geomatics, Univeristat Politècnica de Catalunya 
(gAGE/UPC), Barcelona, Spain and the European Space Agency. The 
processing of the GPS and EGNOS signals was performed at Universitat 
Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC), in Barcelona, using the Basic Research 
Utilities for SBAS (BRUS [21], gAGE/UPC) and Linux workstations. 
BRUS is a software package, designed to be in compliant with 
RTCA/MOPS, and it was developed by gAGE/UPC. One of its main 
characteristics is the ability to provide wide information about the applied 
SBAS messages and how the corrections are internally processed. 
 
This analysis aims to show EGNOS potentialities to protect users by 
applying proper corrections or by eventually excluding a failed satellite 
from the solution. In this analysis it is also shown how EGNOS Protection 
Level is properly set in order to bound the position error. 
 
So, the whole analysis was performed in the following steps: 
 
 For all the days in 2006 and 2007, the broadcast clock values for 
each GPS satellite were compared with a precise reference 
(ftp://ftp.unibe.ch). If the rms value of the difference during the 
whole day was larger than 10 ns, a clock anomaly was found. In this 
step, it was also checked the healthy status of the satellites in the 
GPS navigation message. 
 For all the days with clock anomalies, the position error (vertical and 
horizontal) and the prefit-residuals in GPS Stand-Alone mode and in 
combination with EGNOS were computed. The prefit-residual is the 
difference between the measured pseudorange and the modelled 
pseudorange. In the case of GPS Stand-Alone, the Position Error 
was computed with and without the “failed” satellite, to verify if 
without the “failed” satellite the Position Error was significantly 
lower 
 The EGNOS behaviour was assessed by: 
 Checking if the user is protected by either: 
■ Correcting the error or 
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■ Warning the user about not using the “failed” satellite to 
compute the position. 
 Checking the Protection Levels. 
 Checking the prefit residuals and verifying that EGNOS 
corrections matched the position error due to the “failed” 
satellite. 
 Finally, to assess the integrity at the user level, the Stanford-ESA 
Integrity Diagrams were generated. 
 
As it can be seen, this analysis has been performed both at the Signal In 
Space level and at the user level, in order to give clear and complete results. 
The last two steps were performed using the fixed receiver in Barcelona, but 
in many cases the computation was also repeated for other stations in 
Europe (Toulouse, Delft, Lisbon, Budapest and Sofia), in order to have a 
more general view of the results. 
 
A flow-chart of the complete analysis is shown in the next figure. 
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Figure 4-1: EGNOS clock anomalies analysis flow-chart 
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4.2 Effects of satellite clock anomalies at the Signal 
In Space level 
A GPS clock anomaly is here defined as a divergence between the real and 
the broadcast satellite clock parameters value, without any warning in the 
navigation message (i.e., unhealthy status flag not set in the navigation 
message). Indeed, it can happen that the Ground Segment is not able to 
correctly estimate and predict the value of the GPS satellite clock 
parameters. That could be caused either by a physical anomaly in the 
satellite clock, that suddenly causes large drifts and drifts rates, or by a 
problem with the Ground Segment, which is unable to follow a “normal” 
behaviour of the satellite clock. Whatever the reason is, the problem here is 
that the final user gets wrong information about the value of the GPS clock 
and consequently a wrong position, without being warned.  
 
In order to have an idea of such divergence, the clock parameters broadcast 
in the GPS navigation message can be compared a posteriori with a precise 
reference and the corresponding clock rms error for the full day computed. 
Thus, it can happen that even in presence of a large clock rms error (i.e., 
broadcast clock parameters much different from the real clock parameters), 
the corresponding satellite is flagged as “healthy” in the GPS navigation 
message and used to calculate the position. This represents a potential risk 
for the user: indeed, an undetected clock anomaly has a direct effect at the 
Signal In Space level, increasing the pseudorange error. For instance, a 
clock rms error for the full day of just 10 ns already corresponds to a range 
error of 3 m. Moreover, there could be also short intervals of epochs in 
which the divergence between the real and broadcast clock values leads to 
range errors of hundreds of meters, without the user being warned.  
 
The next figure shows the effect of a clock anomaly at the Signal In Space 
level: the clock rms error for satellite PRN 30 for the full day is 115,97 ns, 
which corresponds to a 34.79 meters rms range error, which is very high. 
The figure also shows a peak of error of more than 150 meters for a short 
time interval at the end of the day. This situation is truly a potential risk for 
the user, because this clock anomaly, not detected by the Ground Segment, 
will mainly contribute to a large position error in a GPS Stand-Alone 
system, as it will be seen in the next section. 
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Figure 4-2: Effect of a clock anomaly at the Signal In Space level. On the horizontal axis 
there are the seconds of the day, on the vertical axis the resulting range error in meters. 
The clock anomaly on the satellite PRN 30 generates a very large error in the range 
domain (blue points), with a peak of more than 150 meters for a short time interval at the 
end of the day. 
4.3 Effects of satellite clock anomalies at the user 
level 
The effect of a clock anomaly at the Signal In Space level corresponds to an 
effect on the computed position at the user level. The entity of the resulting 
position error depends on many factors, since the calculated position is 
affected by different contributions of error, as clock modelling errors, 
specific receiver geometry, multipath and so on. Thence, the error due to a 
clock error can be amplified or reduced at the user level, according to the 
different conditions of the receiver station and to the weight of the satellites 
in the position computation. This means that it is not easy to identify a clock 
anomaly only looking at the user domain, but it is also necessary a deep 
analysis at the Signal In Space level, as done in the previous section. 
Anyway, a clock anomaly not detected by the Control Segment in a GPS 
Stand-Alone system can cause position errors of more than 50 meters in at 
least one of the two planes (horizontal and vertical) and this represents an 
extremely dangerous situation, especially in critical operations. Indeed, this 
magnitude of error in the position domain is larger than the alert limits for 
APV-II and LPV-200 categories in both horizontal and vertical planes. 
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The effect of the previous clock anomaly at the user level is shown in the 
next two figures. Since the satellite PRN 30 is flagged as “healthy” in the 
GPS navigation message, it is used to compute the position in a GPS Stand-
Alone system. In the time interval in which the divergence between the real 
and broadcast clock values reaches a peak of more than 150 m in range, the 
resulting error in the position domain (red points) becomes very large, 
around 50 meters in the horizontal plane (Figure 4-3) and 40 meters in the 
vertical (Figure 4-4). In order to emphasize the effect of the clock anomaly 
at the user domain, the satellite PRN 30 has been also manually excluded 
from the solution and the corresponding position error, which is now highly 
reduced, has been plotted in the same figures (blue points). 
 
 
Figure 4-3: Horizontal position error in GPS Stand-Alone mode. On the horizontal axis 
there are the seconds of the day, on the vertical axis the position error in meters. The 
header of the file contains the name of the receiver station (in this case UPC4), the date in 
the format YY DOY (Day Of the Year), the DOY (153 in this example) and the PRN number 
of the GPS satellite with the abnormal clock behaviour (PRN 30 in this example). It should 
be noted that the figure is zoomed in the time interval of interest (when the clock jump 
occurs). The satellite PRN 30 causes a very large error (around 50 meters) in the 
horizontal plane (red points). Excluding it from the solution, the error highly decreases 
(blue points). The figure also shows the number of used satellites (violet line), to verify that 
the satellite PRN 30 is excluded from the solution (brown line). 
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Figure 4-4: Vertical position error in GPS Stand-Alone mode. Also in this plane, the 
satellite PRN 30 causes a very large error, with a peak of 40 meter (red points). Excluding 
it from the solution, the error highly decreases (blue points). 
 
It is evident that the high position error is exclusively caused by the clock 
anomaly: indeed, it appears exactly when the divergence between the real 
and broadcast clock values becomes very high. Moreover, excluding the 
satellite with the clock anomaly (PRN 30) from the solution, the position 
error is highly reduced. This result is also independent from the specific 
receiver geometry (station in Barcelona, in this case), because the same 
effects were obtained using different fixed receivers in Europe. 
Therefore, in this case the clock anomaly causes a position error larger than 
the alert limit in the correspondent domain without the user being warned of 
it. 
4.4 EGNOS reaction to GPS clock anomalies 
EGNOS capability to protect the user can be verified in few steps: 
 
 At the Signal In Space level, EGNOS prefit-residuals can be 
compared with prefit-residuals in GPS Stand-Alone mode. The 
prefit-residual is the difference between the measured pseudorange 
and the modelled pseudorange. In this way, it is possible to compare 
the range error in a GPS Stand-Alone system with the final range 
error obtained after applying fast and long terms corrections that are 
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broadcast by the EGNOS message. Prefit-residuals also give an idea 
of the quality of EGNOS behaviour, in terms of being too much 
conservative or not (i.e., fast and long term corrections 
overestimating the errors). This analysis is independent from the 
specific geometry of the receiver station. 
 At the user level, the position error using EGNOS message can be 
compared with the position error in GPS Stand-Alone mode. 
Moreover, protection levels are expected to bound the resulting 
position error in both the planes (horizontal and vertical). 
 Finally, to assess the integrity at the user level, the Stanford-ESA 
Integrity Diagrams should be generated. In this way, it is possible to 
verify that the integrity is assured for all possible geometries for a 
given receiver station [20]. 
 
Since the results at the user level depend on the specific geometry of the 
receiver, the computation should be repeated for different stations, in order 
to have a complete control of the situation. This kind of analysis, which 
considers both the Signal In Space level and the user level, is the best 
approach to verify EGNOS reaction in presence of clock anomalies. 
 
The prefit-residual y is the difference between the measured pseudorange 
and the modelled pseudorange. This value is computed for each satellite in 
view with valid EGNOS corrections available according to the following 
expression: 
 
𝑦 = 𝐶1 − 𝜌 + 𝑃𝑅𝐶 + 𝑑𝑡𝑠𝑎𝑡 + Δ𝑡𝑠𝑎𝑡 + 𝑟𝑒𝑙 − 𝑇𝐺𝐷𝑠𝑎𝑡 + 𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑂 + 𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑂 
Eq. 4-1 
 
where: 
 C1 is the measured pseduorange for a given satellite. 
 𝜌 is the geometric range, which contains also the EGNOS long term 
corrections for the satellite coordinates 
 PRC are the EGNOS fast corrections 
 dt
sat
 and TGD
sat
 are the satellite clock bias and the inter-frequency 
bias computed from the GPS navigation message  
 Δt𝑠𝑎𝑡  is the EGNOS long term correction for the satellite clock bias 
 IONO is the ionospheric delay computed from the EGNOS message 
 TROPO is the tropospheric delay computed by the RTCA model [9] 
 rel is a (modelled) term to account relativistic effects. 
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This expression of the prefit-residual clearly shows all the terms of error.  
It should be noted that the prefit-residuals for the GPS Standalone solution 
follow the same equation but without the PRC, terms, Δt𝑠𝑎𝑡  and with the 
IONO delay provided by the Klobuchar model [5]. Moreover, the geometric 
range is computed using only the GPS navigation message. 
 
EGNOS protection levels are computed according to Eq. 2-1 and Eq. 2-2, 
but considering EGNOS contributions in Eq. 2-3. 
 
The next two figures show how EGNOS GEO PRN 124 reacted in presence 
of the clock anomaly seen previously: the position error calculated using 
EGNOS message is much smaller than the one calculated in GPS Stand-
Alone mode and it is now below the required alert limits. This result can be 
verified for both the components of the error (horizontal and vertical). 
Furthermore, the protection levels bound the error, giving a safe solution to 
the user. It should also be noted that, except few isolated points, availability 
is guaranteed for APV-II and LPV-200 categories, being HPL and VPL 
smaller than the corresponding HAL and VAL respectively. 
 
 
Figure 4-5: – Comparison between the horizontal position error using EGNOS message 
(blue) and the horizontal position error in GPS Stand-Alone mode (red). On the horizontal 
axis there are the seconds of the day, on the vertical axis the position error in meters. The 
position error using EGNOS GEO PRN 124 message is much smaller than the position 
error in GPS Stand-Alone mode. Moreover, the protection level (green) bounds the error. 
The figure also highlights the number of used satellite in GPS Stand-Alone mode (violet) 
and using EGNOS message (light blue): as expected, using EGNOS message some 
satellites are excluded from the solution. 
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Figure 4-6: Comparison between the vertical position error using EGNOS message (blue) 
and the vertical position error in GPS Stand-Alone mode (red). Also in this case, when 
using the EGNOS GEO PRN 124 message, the position error is much smaller and the 
protection level (green) bounds the error. 
 
To see more in details the EGNOS behaviour in presence of the error, an 
analysis on the prefit-residuals at the Signal-In-Space level was also 
performed. Figure 4-7 shows the prefit-residuals in GPS Stand-Alone mode, 
emphasizing the prefit-residual for satellite PRN 30 (circles), which has a 
much larger dispersion than the one for all the other satellites (dots). The 
figure also shows again the same peak of around 150 meters in the range 
error, which confirms that in GPS Stand-Alone mode no corrections are 
applied to compensate the error. On the other hand, Figure 4-8 shows how 
the fast and long terms corrections applied by EGNOS message (filled 
circles) initially compensate this dispersion and so the resulting prefit-
residuals for satellite PRN 30 is close to zero (triangles). Then, since the 
dispersion is growing too much, from a certain epoch the satellite PRN 30 is 
excluded from the solution and no fast and long terms corrections are 
available anymore. 
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Figure 4-7: Prefit-residual in GPS Stand-Alone mode. On the horizontal axis there are the 
seconds of the day, on the vertical axis the range error in meters. The prefit-residual of 
satellite PRN 30 (circles) has a larger dispersion than the prefit-residuals of all the other 
satellites (dots). Moreover, there is again the peak of around 150 meters in the range error, 
which shows that no error corrections are applied in GPS Stand-Alone mode. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-8: The fast and long terms corrections applied by EGNOS GEO PRN 124 (filled 
circles) compensate the prefit-residual for satellite PRN 30 in GPS Stand-Alone mode 
(circles). The resulting prefit-residual for satellite PRN 30 (triangles) has a minimum 
dispersion. Moreover, when the range error has become too large, the satellite PRN 30 is 
excluded from the solution and no fast and long terms corrections are available anymore. 
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These results confirm that the used approach – Signal In Space level in 
combination with user level – is a very clear and complete way to verify the 
EGNOS behaviour in presence of clock anomalies. Moreover, the results 
confirmed the expectations: the clock anomaly, which causes a large error in 
a GPS Stand-Alone system, is detected and corrected by EGNOS. 
4.5 Integrity assessment with the Stanford-ESA 
Integrity Diagrams 
In order to assure the integrity for all possible geometries seen by the 
receiver station, the Stanford-ESA Integrity Diagrams for all the analysed 
cases have been generated. 
The Stanford-ESA Integrity Diagram ([20] and [26]), as the name itself 
indicates, is a modification of the well known Stanford Plot, where all (xPE, 
xPL) pairs for all the combinations from 4 to all-in-view satellites are 
represented at each second instead of representing only the pair (xPE, xPL) 
for the all-in-view solution. 
This diagram has been showing its capabilities as a powerful tool for safety 
analysis, since the unsafe system performances are amplified by running 
over all geometries. Indeed, showing that at user level domain there is no 
situation for any possible geometry in which the error overcomes the 
protection level, then this would be the best experimental guarantee that at 
the position domain, for a specific location and epoch, no over-bounding is 
incurred. 
Considering the previous example, where a large clock anomaly was 
detected and well compensated using the EGNOS message, the Stanford-
ESA Integrity Diagrams are generated and plotted in Figure 4-9.  
As it can be seen, no violation of integrity occurred for any of the analysed 
geometry, being all the pairs (xPE,xPL) always above the diagonal: this 
means that the integrity is always assured for all the possible geometries, 
because no error overbounding (xPE > xPL) happened for any of the 
analysed geometries. 
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Figure 4-9: Stanford-ESA Integrity Diagrams. The header of these diagrams contains 
information about the day in the format YYMMDD, the name of the station and server, the 
PRN of GEO associated to the messages, the number of processed epochs (N), the number 
of epochs with valid navigation solution in Precision Approach (PA) mode (NV) and the 
number of computed geometries (NG). The horizontal axis reports the Position Error, while 
the vertical axis reports the Protection Level. As it can be seen, no error overbounding 
happened for any of the analysed geometries. Thus, in this case the use of EGNOS message 
guarantees a safe position to the user. 
4.6 Summary of the results and conclusions 
The EGNOS reaction to GPS clock anomalies has been assessed for a 
period of two years. In most of the analysed cases, the Ground Segment 
correctly detected large divergences between the real and the broadcast 
satellite clock values and the corresponding GPS satellites were correctly 
flagged as “unhealthy” in the GPS navigation message. However, there were 
some cases in which the Ground Segment didn‟t detect the clock anomaly 
and, as a result, the user suffered of an unacceptable position error in GPS 
Stand-Alone mode. In some cases, there were position errors of almost 50 
meters without the user being warned of. 
In such critical situations, this analysis showed that EGNOS was able to 
detect the clock anomalies and highly reduce the position error: in some 
cases the clock anomaly was compensated with the long and fast terms 
corrections and this was discovered by computing the prefit residuals; in 
other cases the user was warned to exclude the satellite with the clock 
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anomaly from the solution. In all the analysed cases, the position errors 
were correctly bounded by the protection levels and both integrity and 
availability were guaranteed. 
In addition, the Stanford-ESA Integrity Diagrams confirmed that the user 
domain error is always bounded by the Protection levels for all 
combinations of satellites, from 4 to all-in-view, with valid EGNOS 
differential corrections available. 
It should be noted that the results were obtained also comparing different 
fixed receivers in Europe, in order to have a more general view of the 
EGNOS behaviour all around Europe and to be independent from the 
geometry of a specific location. 
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Chapter 5  
Multisystem Integrity 
ith the advent of Galileo users will be provided with multiple signals 
coming from different satellite systems. This will improve position 
accuracy, because the number of satellites in view per user will be almost 
doubled. Moreover, the higher measurements redundancy will help to 
guarantee a safer position and the detection of errors. This will result also in 
an improved availability and in this way the requirements for more 
demanding flight categories can be satisfied. Therefore, it is necessary to 
introduce a base-line for a combined system, defining new parameters, new 
integrity algorithms and possible ways to combine the two independent 
systems. For example, in a combined system the event of two simultaneous 
failures is more probable than in a single system. Therefore, the dual failure 
case has to be taken into account when considering a combined system. 
In the next sections, new parameters, concepts and assumptions will be 
introduced, in order to define the general conditions for a combined system 
during a precision approach. Then, different techniques to provide 
multisystem integrity will be described. The first presented method is an 
extension of the current GPS+RAIM technique. On the other hand, the 
second method will consider an extension of the Galileo integrity algorithm 
in order to include also GPS data. 
Other possible methods will be briefly described in the last sections, 
together with future developments. 
 
The aim of this final research is to find a set of techniques to combine the 
two systems and to offer a base-line for further developments including 
even more systems and sensors. 
5.1 A combined system 
Here follows the definition of the parameters to be considered in a dual 
system in case of single and multiple failures. This study aims to provide a 
common base-line for different methods that can be used to combine the 
W 
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GPS and the Galileo systems in order to provide integrity improving 
availability. 
5.1.1 Probability of Failure 
5.1.1.1 Satellite failure probability for Galileo satellites 
The exponential failure model considered for GPS satellites can‟t be applied 
to Galileo satellites. Moreover, for Galileo constellation it can‟t be assumed 
that the satellites in orbit have randomly distributed ages. Therefore a 
different model of the probability of failure for Galileo satellites should be 
addressed. However, ESA has established a value for the Probability of 
Failure for Galileo satellites equal to 2.7x10
-6
/150s assuming 10 satellites in 
view [12]. No information is available about the entity of the pseudorange 
error to be considered as a failure in Galileo. However, from this value it is 
possible to derive, as done for GPS, the individual failure probability per 
satellite and the probability of having multiple simultaneous failures. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that in this case a different Ground Segment 
detection time should be considered when computing the probability of 
failure during an approach: this time is shorter than 1 hour and, even if no 
public information is available yet, it could be assumed to be 20 minutes. 
Therefore, the probability of Galileo satellite failure during an approach is 
assumed to be: 
 
𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐 𝑕 = 2.7 × 10
−6/150 ∙ 1200 = 2.16 × 10−5/𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐𝑕 
Eq. 5-1 
 
Again, it is possible to derive the individual probability of failure and the 
probability of multiple independent failures. It should be noted that common 
mode failures are expected to be present also in Galileo and to be more 
frequent than in GPS, because the ground segment will update several SVs 
with the same batch of the OSPF (Orbitography and Synchronisation 
Processing Facility) process. Therefore, a slightly higher value of the 
probability of common mode failures should be assumed for Galileo. 
Although a public available value is not given yet, a probability of 2x10
-8 
/approach could be considered a good estimation for Galileo common mode 
failures. 
The next table summarises the previous results. 
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Parameters Recommended values 
Galileo Satellite Failure 
Probability 
(10 satellites in view) 
Precision Approach (LPV-200) 
2.16x10-5/approach 
Galileo Common Mode Failures 
Probability 
Precision Approach (LPV-200) 
2x10-8/approach 
Table 5-1: Galileo Satellite failure probability 
5.1.1.2 Satellite failure probability for a dual constellation 
In this paragraph values for the probabilities of satellite failure for a dual 
constellation for precision approach are derived. The computation is based 
on the previous assumptions. 
 
Let‟s consider now the following further assumptions: 
 For both GPS and Galileo the number of satellites in view is 10, so 
the total number of satellites for the dual constellation is 20 
 Errors in one system are assumed to be uncorrelated with errors in 
the other system 
 The probability of no failures (fault-free case) for GPS and Galileo is 
almost 1 
 The probabilities of two simultaneous failures for a single system are 
calculated using Eq. 1-13. 
 
Let‟s use now some notations: 
 
pGPS=1x10
-5
/approach/SV 
 pGAL=2.16x10
-6
/approach/SV 
 
𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 ,10,1
𝐺𝑃𝑆 = 1 × 10−4/𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐𝑕 
𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 ,10,1
𝐺𝐴𝐿 = 2.16 × 10−5/𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐𝑕 
 
𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖 𝑙 ,10,2
𝐺𝑃𝑆 = 4.5 × 10−9/𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐𝑕 
𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 ,10,2
𝐺𝐴𝐿 = 2.1 × 10−10/𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐𝑕 
 
𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 ,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛
𝐺𝑃𝑆 = 1.3 × 10−8/𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐𝑕 
𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 ,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛
𝐺𝐴𝐿 = 2 × 10−8/𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐𝑕 
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𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 ,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛
𝐺𝑃𝑆+𝐺𝐴𝐿 = 0 
 
𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 −𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒
𝐺𝑃𝑆 ≈ 1 
𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 −𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒
𝐺𝐴𝐿 ≈ 1 
 
Therefore, the probability of having one single failure in the dual 
constellation is given by: 
 
𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 ,20,1
𝐺𝑃𝑆+𝐺𝐴𝐿 = 𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 ,10,1
𝐺𝑃𝑆 ∙ 𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 −𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒
𝐺𝐴𝐿 + 𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 ,10,1
𝐺𝐴𝐿 ∙ 𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 −𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒
𝐺𝑃𝑆  
= 1.22 × 10−4/𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐𝑕 
Eq. 5-2 
 
While the probability of having multiple failures, including common mode 
failures, is given by: 
 
 
𝑃𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 −𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝐺𝑃𝑆+𝐺𝐴𝐿 = 𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 ,10,2
𝐺𝑃𝑆 ∙ 𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 −𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒
𝐺𝐴𝐿 + 𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 ,10,2
𝐺𝐴𝐿 ∙ 𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 −𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒
𝐺𝑃𝑆  
+𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 ,10,1
𝐺𝑃𝑆 ∙ 𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 ,10,1
𝐺𝐴𝐿 + 𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 ,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛
𝐺𝑃𝑆 ∙ 𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 −𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒
𝐺𝐴𝐿  
+𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 ,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛
𝐺𝐴𝐿 ∙ 𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 −𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒
𝐺𝑃𝑆 + 𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 ,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛
𝐺𝑃𝑆 ∙ 𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 ,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛
𝐺𝐴𝐿  
+𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 ,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛
𝐺𝑃𝑆+𝐺𝐴𝐿  
≈ 4 × 10−8/𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐𝑕 
Eq. 5-3 
 
 
Parameters Recommended values 
GPS+Galileo Satellite Failure 
Probability 
(20 satellites in view) 
Precision Approach (LPV-200) 
1.22x10-4/approach 
GPS+Galileo Multiple Failures 
Probability 
Precision Approach (LPV-200) 
4x10-8/approach 
Table 5-2: GPS+Galileo Satellite failure probability 
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5.1.2 Probability of Missed Detection 
5.1.2.1 Probability of Missed Detection for Galileo 
The probability of missed detection for Galileo for precision approach can 
be obtained in the same manner as for GPS: 
 
𝑃𝑚𝑑 =
1 × 10−7/𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐𝑕
2.16 × 10−5/𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐𝑕
= 4.6 × 10−3/𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 
 
Eq. 5-4 
 
As before, also in the case of multiple failures, the same requirement for the 
probability of missed detection will be conservatively considered. 
 
 
Parameter Recommended value 
Maximum Allowable Probability of 
Missed Detection 
Galileo satellites 
 
4.6x10-3/sample 
Table 5-3: Maximum Allowable Probability of Missed Detection for Galileo 
5.1.2.2 Probability of Missed Detection for a dual constellation system 
Previous calculations can be easily extended to a dual constellation system, 
recalling the results that were obtained in section 5.1.1.2: 
 
𝑃𝑚𝑑 =
1 × 10−7/𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐𝑕
1.22 × 10−4/𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐𝑕
= 8.2 × 10−4/𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 
Eq. 5-5 
 
As before, also in the case of multiple failures, the same requirement for the 
probability of missed detection will be conservatively considered. 
 
Parameter Recommended value 
Maximum Allowable Probability of 
Missed Detection 
GPS+Galileo satellites 
 
8.2x10-4/sample 
Table 5-4: Maximum Allowable Probability of Missed Detection for GPS+Galileo 
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5.1.3 Probability of False Alarm 
5.1.3.1 Probability of False Alarm for Galileo 
Also for Galileo, half of the continuity risk requirement for precision 
approach should be allocated to false alarms. Therefore, also in this case the 
required probability of false alarm is equal to 4x10
-6
/sample. 
 
 
Parameter Recommended value 
Probability of False Alarm 
Galileo satellites 
Precision Approach 
4x10-6/sample 
Table 5-5: Recommended value for Probability of False Alarm for Galileo satellites 
5.1.3.2 Probability of False Alarm for a dual system 
The same result could be applied to a dual system and therefore it could be 
considered again half of the continuity risk requirement for the probability 
of false alarm. However, for a dual system the occurrence of true alerts is 
more frequent than for a single system. Therefore, a different apportionment 
should be done now, allocating a larger amount of the continuity risk to true 
alerts and a smaller amount to false alerts. From several tests and 
simulations performed during this study and considering the satellite failure 
probability for a combined system, it was found that a value of 1x10
-6 
/sample represents a safe value for the probability of false alarm. 
 
Parameter Recommended value 
Probability of False Alarm 
GPS+Galileo satellites 
Precision Approach 
1x10-6/sample 
Table 5-6: Recommended value for Probability of False Alarm for GPS+Galileo satellites 
5.2 GPS and Galileo with RAIM algorithms 
In this section a first method to combine GPS and Galileo will be discussed. 
This method is an extension to the technique discussed in chapter 3 and it is 
the simplest way to combine the two systems. Indeed, measurements, 
geometry and UERE values from the two systems represent the input for 
RAIM algorithms that work in a similar manner as seen for a single system. 
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The next analyses will include again the single and the dual failure cases. It 
is clearly expected an improved availability, due to a smaller position error 
and a smaller protection level, because of a better geometry and a higher 
redundancy of the measurements.  
5.2.1 Overview and base-line 
The software that has been developed is composed by several modules and 
the general algorithm base-line is depicted in the next picture, while the 
algorithm flow-chart is the same as the one for the single constellation case 
(Figure 3-2). 
 
 
 
 
As done in chapter 3, several random trials should be performed for any 
geometry in order to test the RAIM algorithms capability to detect single 
and multiple failures in a dual constellation scenario. This time the 
requirement for the probability of missed detection is slightly different, 
therefore the number of Monte Carlo runs to be considered is 305000 
instead of 250000. This number comes out from several independent tests. 
Also in this case, the number of missed detections should be less than or 
equal to 250, in order to satisfy the Pmd requirement of 8.2x10
-4
. 
 
The nominal Walker constellation, as defined in [12], has been considered 
for Galileo and the corresponding Keplerian orbital parameters have been 
simulated through a specific module of the software that has been developed 
 
Figure 5-1: GPS+Galileo+RAIM algorithm base-line 
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and that solves Keplerian equations according to the methods described in 
[31]. On the other hand, a specific almanac has been used for the GPS 
constellation and the corresponding orbital parameters have been generated 
through another module of the software that has been developed, while 
Keplerian equations are solved in a similar manner as for Galileo. In this 
way the full 32 satellites GPS constellation was considered, instead of the 
nominal 24 satellites constellation defined in [4]. The geometries that were 
tested were generated through additional software considering all the points 
on the Earth sampled every 3 degrees in latitude from ninety degrees north 
to ninety degrees south. Each latitude circle has points separated evenly in 
longitude, defined as: 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝 =
360
𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑁𝐷  
360
𝑀𝐼𝑁 3𝑑𝑒𝑔/ cos 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 , 360 
 
 
Eq. 5-6 
 
This grid yields to 4603 points in space, which are then sampled every 150 
seconds minutes for 72 hours (1728 time points), which is the expected 
GPS+Galileo geometry repetition. Therefore, the total number of space-time 
points is: 
 
4603x1728= 7,953,984 space-time points 
 
This grid analysis is derived from RTCA [9], but it has been extended in 
order to include also Galileo and, for a global coverage, the Southern 
Hemisphere and can be applied to precision approaches, whose duration is 
typically 150 seconds. However, in the following sections only results for 
some specific geometry will be shown. 
 
Keplerian orbital parameters for each satellite are then converted into a 
Cartesian reference system (ECEF: Earth Centered Earth Fixed) and into a 
local reference system (ENU: East, North, Up) in order to calculate the 
geometry, the position and the corresponding position error and test statistic. 
This conversion is done by several modules included in the developed 
software and they consider the rotation matrices and equations described in 
[32]. Elevation and azimuth angles are computed by a separated module that 
also checks which satellites are in view and are “healthy” (according to a 
specific flag in the almanac). Details on how to calculate elevation and 
azimuth angles can be found in [31] and [32].  
Chapter 5: Multisystem Integrity                                                                91 
 
 
It should be noted that for a dual constellation the number of unknowns is 
now 5 instead of 4, because there are now two clock biases to calculate, one 
for each system. Thus, design matrices should be inflated in order to include 
also the additional unknown clock bias of the second system. Therefore, the 
minimum number of measurements to calculate the user position with a dual 
constellation system is now 5. 
 
The general test conditions are summarised in the next table. 
 
General Test Conditions Dual Constellation 
GPS Almanac 012.AL3 (SEM format) 2008 
GPS week 1462 
GPS seconds of the week 157456 
Galileo Constellation Nominal 27 satellites Walker 
Constellation 
Galileo week GPS week 1462 
Galileo seconds of the week GPS seconds of the week 157456 
Probability of Missed Detection 8.2x10
-4
/sample 
Probability of False Alarm 1x10
-6
/sample 
UERE Values depend on elevation angles 
Noise ~N(0,UERE) 
Mask angle 5 degrees 
Receiver position (latitude, 
longitude, height) 
[40°51‟N, 14°18‟E, 61meters] 
Number of random trials 305,000 
Vertical Alert Limit 35m (LPV-200) 
Table 5-7: General test conditions for testing RAIM algorithms (dual constellation) 
 
UERE values for Galileo are defined in [12], while for GPS are the same 
used in chapter 3. These values depend on elevation angles and therefore 
during the simulations the following look-up tables are considered. 
 
GPS UERE budget 
 Elevation angle (deg) 
UERE 
(m) 
0 5 10 15 20 30 40 50 60 90.1 
1.9 1.9 1.36 1.15 1.04 0.96 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.91 
Table 5-8: GPS UERE 
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Galileo UERE budget 
 Elevation angle (deg) 
UERE 
(m) 
0 5 10 15 20 30 40 50 60 90.1 
1.87 1.87 1.37 1.22 1.15 1.11 1.09 1.08 1.08 1.07 
Table 5-9: Galileo UERE 
5.2.2 Nominal conditions: no failures 
When all satellites are behaving nominally, the error ellipse should ideally 
be in the nominal operations region, even if a certain number of false alarms 
are allowed, according to the required probability of false. In order to be 
statistically accurate, this test should consider a number of trials much larger 
than 305,000. In this way it is possible to accommodate the required 
probability of false alert. However, since in this framework it is important to 
test RAIM capability to detect satellite failures, this analysis is not relevant 
at the moment and will be neglected. 
The next picture shows the RAIM nominal behaviour with 305,000 random 
trials and the general test conditions described in Table 5-7, Table 5-8 and 
Table 5-9, but with no failures and considering only Stanford Protection 
level. As expected, the error ellipse is in the “Normal Operations” region, 
but the Pfa requirement is not satisfied. However, as stated before, this result 
for the false alarm rate is not accurate, since a higher number of random 
trials would be required to confirm it. 
 
 
Figure 5-2: RAIM in nominal conditions for a dual constellation 
Chapter 5: Multisystem Integrity                                                                93 
 
 
5.2.3 Single failure 
In the next tests, it is conservatively assumed that the worst case bias is 
affecting the least detectable satellite of the dual constellation, which is the 
satellite with the highest slope, as described in the previous chapters. The 
worst case bias is again found numerically for any geometry, as done for the 
single constellation case, by calculating the resulting Pmd for each bias value 
ranging from -20 to 20 metres. 
 
The following test considers a realistic scenario: the software simulates a 
precision approach with the receiver on an aircraft that is flying at 200 feet 
(61 meters) above the International Airport of Capodichino, Naples, Italy. 
200 feet is the decision height to perform a precision approach in category 
LPV-200.  
Two different methods are considered to calculate protection level, as done 
for the single constellation case: in particular, Stanford method and Brown‟s 
method, which uses the pbiasb concept, are considered. 
  
The specific simulation data are summarised in the next table. 
 
Simulation Data Single Failure Dual Constellation 
Bias Worst case bias on the least 
detectable satellite 
Number of satellites in view 18 (9 GPS, 9 Galileo) 
Protection Level 1
st
 case 𝑉𝑃𝐿 = 𝑉𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑇 𝑁, 𝑃𝑓𝑎 + 𝑘 𝑃𝑚𝑑  𝜍𝑉 
Protection Level 2
nd
 case 𝑉𝑃𝐿 = 𝑉𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥 ⋅ 𝑝𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝐵 
Pmd 1
st
 case 8.20x10
-5
 (computed) / 8.52x10
-5
  
(theoretical) 
Pmd 2
nd
 case 3.70x10
-4
 (computed) / 3.50x10
-4
 
(theoretical) 
Table 5-10: Simulation data (single failure, dual constellation) – International Airport of 
Capodichino 
 
The next figures show the results of the simulations using the two methods 
to calculate protection levels. 
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Figure 5-3: RAIM with a bias of 12 meters on the least detectable satellite – Stanford VPL 
(Capodichino) 
 
 
Figure 5-4: RAIM with a bias of 12 meters on the least detectable satellite – Brown VPL 
(Capodichino) 
 
As expected both methods are working well in terms of probability of 
missed detection, with the Brown‟s method being more conservative, since 
the pbiasb concept provides a larger protection level. Also in this case, the 
computed values of Pmd are very close to the theoretical ones. 
Concerning availability, as expected, a dual constellation provides a higher 
availability than a single constellation. This is due to a better geometry, 
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because of a greater number of satellites in view. Indeed, a better geometry 
results in smaller slope values for each satellite and therefore in a lower 
VPL. Thus, for this specific geometry, availability is guaranteed even for 
CAT-I (VAL=10 meters). 
5.2.4 Multiple failures 
For the multiple failures case, five different methods to calculate protection 
levels and slopes are considered: the Angus‟ method [15], the Stanford 
method using the dual failure slope given in [14], the Brown‟s method [14], 
the Liu‟s method [16] and the Stanford method using Liu‟s slope. As before, 
it is conservatively assumed that the worst case biases are affecting the 
worst pair of satellites. The general test conditions are described in Table 
5-7, Table 5-8 and Table 5-9. 
 
The next test considers the same scenario used for the single failure test: it is 
again simulated an approach with the receiver on an aircraft flying at 200 
feet over the International Airport of Capodichino. This time the software 
adds two failures to the worst pair of satellites in view. The specific 
simulation data are summarised in the next table. 
 
Simulation Data Dual Failure Dual Constellation 
Bias Worst case biases on the least 
detectable pair of satellites 
Number of satellites in view 18 (9 GPS, 9 Galileo) 
Protection Level 1
st
 case 𝑉𝑃𝐿 = 𝑉𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒1𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝑇 𝑁, 𝑃𝑓𝑎 + 𝑘 𝑃𝑚𝑑  𝜍𝑉 
Protection Level 2
nd
 case 𝑉𝑃𝐿 = 𝑉𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒2𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝑇 𝑁, 𝑃𝑓𝑎  + 𝑘 𝑃𝑚𝑑  𝜍𝑉  
Protection Level 3
rd
 case 𝑉𝑃𝐿 = 𝑉𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒2𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 ⋅ 𝑝𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝐵  
Protection Level 4
th
 case 𝑉𝑃𝐿 = 𝑉𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒3𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 ⋅ 𝑝𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝐵  
Protection Level 5
th
 case 𝑉𝑃𝐿 = 𝑉𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒3𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝑇 𝑁, 𝑃𝑓𝑎  + 𝑘 𝑃𝑚𝑑  𝜍𝑉  
Pmd 1
st
 case 5.90x10
-5
 (computed) / 5.61x10
-5
  
(theoretical) 
Pmd 2
nd
 case 3.28x10
-6
 (computed) / 1.01x10
-5
 
(theoretical) 
Pmd 3
rd
 case 0 (computed) / 6.52x10
-8
 (theoretical) 
Pmd 4
th
 case 3.28x10
-6
 (computed) / 9.64x10
-7
 
(theoretical) 
Pmd 5
th
 case 3.93x10
-5
 (computed) / 3.43x10
-5
 
(theoretical) 
Table 5-11: Simulation data (dual failure, dual constellation) – International Airport of 
Capodichino 
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The next figures show results for the five different methods that were used 
to calculate protection levels. In this specific test no violation of the Pmd 
requirements occurred. It can be also noted that the methods that use the 
pbiasb concept are more conservative.  
 
 
Figure 5-5: RAIM in dual failure case: Angus VPL (Capodichino) 
 
 
Figure 5-6: RAIM in dual failure case: Stanford VPL (Capodichino) 
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Figure 5-7: RAIM in dual failure case: Brown VPL (Capodichino) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-8: RAIM in dual failure case: Liu VPL (Capodichino) 
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Figure 5-9: RAIM in dual failure case: Stanford-Liu VPL (Capodichino) 
 
 
As expected, all the methods are consistent in terms of Pmd, with some 
slightly differences among them: the methods that use the pbiasb concept 
are more conservative and the Liu‟s method provides the highest value of 
the dual failure slope. Therefore, the last method seems to be a good 
compromise between being conservative and keeping as low as possible the 
protection level: indeed, in this method the dual failure slope is computed 
according to the most conservative method, but the protection level is 
computed using Stanford equation rather than the pbiasb concept.  
For this specific geometry, all methods satisfy the availability for APV-II 
and LPV-200, but none of them for CAT-I. 
5.2.5 Availability results 
All the 7,953,984 space-time points were tested with the developed software 
as done in the example geometry shown in the previous section. Therefore, 
complete availability results were obtained: it has been found that RAIM 
algorithms have capabilities to protect user from dual failure when a dual 
constellation is considered, at least until APV-II, where the availability, for 
some methods is more than 99.9%. On the other hand, CAT-I could be 
guaranteed only for very good geometries and with less conservative 
methods used to calculate VPL. However, better results are expected 
considering lower values for UERE budgets. 
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The following figures summarises the availability results for all the 
7,953,984 geometries considering the first method (Angus) to calculate 
protection level for the dual failure case. In particular, availability for LPV-
200 is 100%, while for APV-II is 99.98%. On the other hand, under these 
assumptions, the availability requirement for CAT-I is not satisfied. 
 
 
Figure 5-10: RAIM availability for all the 7,953,984 space-time points considering the VPL 
computed with method #1, using conservative UERE values 
 
Therefore, this technique to combine GPS and Galileo data using a specific 
RAIM algorithm is very attractive and lead to interesting results both in 
terms of integrity and availability even for demanding categories of flight 
without any additional effort in terms of computational load and of system 
cost. 
5.3 GPS and Galileo with the Galileo Integrity 
algorithm 
The following technique considers the Galileo Integrity equation (Eq. 2-16) 
as the basis for the multisystem integrity algorithm. Indeed, it is possible to 
collect orbital data and UERE values from both GPS and Galileo and use 
them as input for the Galileo Integrity equation. The output will be then 
constituted of the Integrity Risk of the overall combined system. 
Given that the algorithm is capable of raising timely warnings to the user 
whenever the Integrity Risk requirement is violated, the scope of this 
analysis is to show that with a dual constellation the total integrity risk is 
always much lower than in single constellation, even in severely degraded 
scenarios. This means that if a precision approach cannot be performed 
within a single system, because of a total integrity risk higher than the 
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requirement, within a combined system the user can safely rely on the 
computed position, because the total integrity risk is now lower than the 
requirement. This is the advantage of using a dual constellation and of 
extending the Galileo integrity equation to the combined system. 
5.3.1 Overview and base-line 
GPS and Galileo integrity data are the inputs for the Galileo Integrity 
equation: 
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Eq. 5-7 
 
which must be modified in order to include also GPS data. Indeed, the error 
distribution in the range domain for GPS is given by: 
 
𝜍𝑈𝐸𝑅𝐸 ,𝑖
2 = 𝜍𝑈𝑅𝐴 ,𝑖
2 + 𝜍𝑈𝐼𝑅𝐸 ,𝑖
2 + 𝜍𝑙𝑜𝑐 ,𝑖
2 + 𝜍𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜 ,𝑖
2  
Eq. 5-8 
 
while for Galileo is given by: 
 
𝜍𝑈𝐸𝑅𝐸 ,𝑖
2 = 𝑆𝐼𝑆𝐴𝑖
2 + 𝜍𝑙𝑜𝑐 ,𝑖
2  
Eq. 5-9 
 
Given that the same overbounding technique is used for both the Signal-in-
Space error distributions, there is a correspondence between 𝜍𝑈𝑅𝐴
2  and 
SISA
2
, because they both represent the SIS contribution (clock and 
ephemeris) to the final error in the range domain. Therefore, GPS  𝜍𝑈𝑅𝐴
2  can 
be used in Eq. 5-7 in the same manner SISA
2
 is used for Galileo. More 
details about overbounding techniques can be found in Appendix B. 
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On the other hand, the local errors contribution is the same for both systems, 
since it depends only on the receiver. The ionosphere and troposphere 
contributions could be computed for Galileo in the same manner as done for 
GPS. However, in a dual frequency receiver the ionospheric error is 
negligible. Moreover, the tropospheric contribution is expected to be very 
small. Therefore, for this analysis, only the SIS and local contributions will 
be considered. 
UERE values for GPS and Galileo will be then translated in the position 
domain and included in Eq. 5-7. It should be noted that since GPS doesn‟t 
provide a parameter similar to SISMA, the faulty case is considered only for 
Galileo satellites. Therefore, GPS data are used only in the fault-free part of 
the algorithm and then combined with Galileo data. 
 
The following figure shows the base-line of the proposed technique: 
 
 
 
Figure 5-11: Baseline of the multisystem integrity architecture using the Galileo Integrity 
algorithm 
 
5.3.2 Algorithm description 
The next figure shows the modules that constitute the software that has been 
developed to calculate the Galileo HMI Probability. 
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Figure 5-12: Modules of the Galileo Integrity Algorithm 
 
where: 
 
Inputs 
 Keplerian orbital data, coming from the GPS and Galileo navigation 
messages. These elements are collected from real almanacs for GPS, 
while they are simulated for Galileo through a specific module of the 
software. Keplerian equations are then solved and the relevant 
parameters converted into a Cartesian reference system (ECEF) and 
a local reference system (ENU). 
 The estimation of the receiver position, used in the weighted least 
squares solution. The receiver position is computed in several 
coordinate frames: ECEF, ENU and also in the spherical system 
(i.e., latitude, longitude and height). Specific modules of the 
software have been developed to perform the coordinate 
conversions. 
 The range error contributions for Galileo (SISA and SISMA) and for 
GPS (URA or UDRE in case of EGNOS) at the Signal-in-Space 
level. These parameters are generated through a specific module of 
the software. 
 
Configuration parameters 
 VAL and HAL, which depend on the specific application  
 Pmd, Pfa, Pfailure, which depend on the system requirements 
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 IR threshold, which depends on the system requirements and on the 
specific application 
 
Outputs parameters 
 Integrity Risk/150 seconds. Therefore, this is the Integrity Risk 
computed for the next critical operation, which lasts 150 seconds 
(i.e., precision approach). 
 
 
The algorithm is constituted by the following macro-modules: 
 
 The visibility module checks the current geometry satellites-receiver. 
This includes the geometry computation, coordinate conversions and 
elevation and azimuth angles computation. This module also checks 
the “healthy” status of each satellite 
 The UERE module calculates the final UERE at the user level 
including the Signal-In-Space and the local contributions. The 
Signal-in-Space contribution is generated through a specific module, 
while local contributions are computed by a separated module using 
equations described in the following section. 
 The M module calculates the typical topocentric weighted design 
matrix used for least squares position estimation. This matrix is the 
K matrix used in the RAIM algorithm tests. Therefore, a similar 
module has been used. 
 The FF and FM modules calculate the standard deviation in the 
vertical and horizontal domain for the fault-free and faulty mode 
respectively. These modules use the Galileo Integrity equations 
described in the chapter 2. 
 The HMI module calculates the final Integrity Risk from the required 
Vertical and Horizontal Alert Limits. This module uses the Galileo 
Integrity equations described in chapter 2. 
5.3.3 General Test Conditions 
The following simulations will show results in nominal and degraded 
conditions for single and dual constellation. Different levels of degradation 
of the parameters will be considered. Indeed, the Galileo integrity risk 
equation doesn‟t check the consistency of the position solution. Therefore, 
the Galileo integrity risk equation at the user level is not able to detect bias 
104                                                         Chapter 5: Multisystem Integrity 
 
 
on pseudorange, as RAIM algorithms do, because it is assumed that these 
kinds of failures are already detected by the ground segment. However, the 
Galileo Integrity algorithm foresees a single undetected failure affecting one 
satellite. The magnitude of this bias depends on SISA and SISMA, 
according to the following equation: 
 
𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑗 = 𝑘𝑃𝑓𝑎 ⋅  𝑆𝐼𝑆𝐴𝑗
2 + 𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑗
2 
Eq. 5-10 
 
where j indicates the satellite affected by the bias and kPfa depends on the 
probability of false alarms and it is usually assumed to be 5.212. In nominal 
conditions, the previous equation leads to an expected undetected bias with 
magnitude equal to 5 meters. In this manner, the final integrity risk, 
including also the single failure contribution, can guarantee a safe position 
to the user, if it is less than the requirement. 
 
For the next simulations, Pmd, Pfa and Pfailure values are chosen according to 
the assumptions made in the previous sections. UERE values for Galileo are 
given by Eq. 5-9, where SISA is 0.85 m in nominal conditions and 1.0 m in 
degraded conditions, while local errors are computed according to the 
following interpolation formula that depends on the elevation angles: 
𝜍𝑙𝑜𝑐 ,𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 ⋅ 𝑒
−10⋅𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖  
Eq. 5-11 
where: 
 
 Elevi is the current elevation angle for the i
th
 satellite [radians] 
 the parameters a and b are computed off-line using as follows 
 
 
𝑎
𝑏
 =  𝐴𝑇 ⋅ 𝐴 −1 ⋅ 𝐴 ⋅ 𝜍𝑖  
Eq. 5-12 
 
being  
 
𝐴 =  
1 𝑒−10⋅𝐸1
⋮ ⋮
1 𝑒−10⋅𝐸𝑚
    𝜍 =  
𝜍1
⋮
𝜍𝑚
  
 
  where:  
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 m is the number of reference elevation angles for definition of UERE 
local component values   
 Ei (i=1 to m) is the i
th
 reference elevation angle  [radians]  
 𝜍𝑖  (i=1 to m) is the predicted standard deviation of the UERE local 
component at the i
th
 reference elevation angle. 
 
The following reference values have been considered for the local UERE as 
a function of the elevation angles: 
 
Reference 
Elevation  
Angle 
[radians] 
i=1 to m 
0.1745 0.2618 0.3491 0.5236 0.6981 0.8727 1.0472 1.5708 
𝝈𝒊 
i=1 to m 
[meters] 
1.0300 0.7800 0.6700 0.6000 0.5800 0.5700 0.5600 0.5500 
Table 5-12: Reference values for the predicted standard deviation of the UERE local 
component as a function of the elevation angles 
 
SISMA values are equal to 0.7 m and 1.0 m in nominal and degraded 
conditions respectively. URA for GPS satellites is assumed to be equal to 
0.7 m and 1.0 for nominal and degraded conditions respectively. 
Degraded values of SISA, SISMA and URA represent degradation of the 
navigation message uploaded by the Ground Segment to the satellites. 
Indeed, SISA, SISMA and URA are calculated, for each satellite, by the 
Ground Segment, based on long term observations, and their values are 
uploaded to the satellites in the same batch. Therefore, a not nominal 
behaviour of these parameters represents long term errors based on wrong 
observations. The software that has been developed simulates both nominal 
and degraded scenarios. 
In the following simulations, it has been assumed a similar interpolation 
formula also for GPS local errors, therefore also for GPS the final UERE is 
given by: 
 
𝜍𝑈𝐸𝑅𝐸 ,𝑖
2 = 𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑖
2 + 𝜍𝑙𝑜𝑐 ,𝑖
2  
Eq. 5-13 
 
In some tests, a step (bias) is added to the SISA value of 1 or 2 random 
Galileo satellites and to the URA value of 1 or 2 random GPS satellites.  
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This represents a severely degraded scenario, because biases on SISA and 
URA for 1 or 2 satellites represent instantaneous undetected errors affecting 
only specific satellites. These kinds of errors are short term errors and, if not 
timely detected by the ground segment, can severely affect the final position 
error. 
The mask angle is conservatively assumed to be equal to 10 degrees for both 
systems, in order to test geometries with less usable satellites. 
1001 epochs are considered for each test, sampled at every 150 seconds, 
which is the typical length of an approach. Therefore, geometries are 
assumed to be independent at every 150 seconds, as well as all the other 
parameters. 
It should be noted that for the following simulations a more relaxed value 
for the integrity risk threshold as been considered, as suggested in [12], 
instead of the more stringent LPV-200 requirement. However, the final 
results were not affected by this assumption. On the other hand, for HAL 
and VAL more demanding values have been chosen [12], instead of the less 
stringent values of the alert limits for LPV-200. Therefore, if the integrity 
risk is satisfied for these demanding values, it is also satisfied for LPV-200.  
The next tables summarise the general test conditions for single and dual 
constellation. 
 
General Test Conditions - Galileo only 
Galileo Constellation Nominal 27 satellites Walker 
Constellation 
Galileo week GPS week 1462 
Galileo seconds of the week GPS seconds of the week 157456 
Probability of Missed Detection 4.6x10
-3
/sample 
Probability of False Alarm 4x10
-6
/sample 
UERE Values depend on elevation angles 
Noise ~N(0,UERE) 
kPfa 5.212 
Mask angle 10 degrees 
Receiver position (latitude, 
longitude, height) 
[40°51‟N, 14°18‟E, 61meters]  
Number of tested epochs 1001 
Vertical Alert Limit 20 m 
Horizontal Alert Limit 12 m 
Integrity Risk Threshold 1.7x10
-7
/150s 
Probability of Failure 2.16x10
-6
/150s 
Table 5-13: General test conditions for single constellation (Galileo only) 
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General Test Conditions – GPS-Galileo dual constellation 
GPS Almanac 012.AL3 (SEM format) 2008 
GPS week 1462 
GPS seconds of the week 157456 
Galileo Constellation Nominal 27 satellites Walker 
Constellation 
Galileo week GPS week 1462 
Galileo seconds of the week GPS seconds of the week 157456 
Probability of Missed Detection 8.2x10
-4
/sample 
Probability of False Alarm 1.13x10
-6
/sample 
UERE Values depend on elevation angles 
Noise ~N(0,UERE) 
kPfa 5.212 
Mask angle 10 degrees 
Receiver position (latitude, 
longitude, height) 
[40°51‟N, 14°18‟E, 61meters]  
Number of tested epochs 1001 
Vertical Alert Limit 20 m 
Horizontal Alert Limit 12 m 
Integrity Risk Threshold 1.7x10
-7
/150s 
Probability of Failure 2.16x10
-6
/150s 
Table 5-14: General test conditions for dual constellation 
5.3.4 Nominal conditions 
Here come results in nominal conditions in the following two scenarios: the 
first case considers only Galileo constellation, the second case considers 
Galileo in combination with GPS. In both cases, nominal values where 
considered for SISA and SISMA for Galileo and for URA for GPS. It 
should be noted that the SISA value provided by the Galileo Integrity 
Processing Facility (IPF) is multiplied by 1.1 at the user level, in order to 
take into account further degradations of the signal. 
 
Scenario #1 – Nominal conditions - Galileo only 
SISA-IPF 0.85 m for each satellite in view 
SISA at the user level SISA-IPF∙1.1 
SISMA 0.7 m for each satellite in view 
Table 5-15: Simulation data in nominal conditions, Galileo constellation only 
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The next figure shows results for scenario #1. As expected, for any 
geometry the total Integrity Risk is lower than the threshold that has been 
considered. Therefore, no alarm should be raised by the system and the user 
can safely perform the critical operation (i.e., precision approach). 
 
 
Figure 5-13: Integrity Risk results in nominal conditions (Galileo constellation) 
 
Similar results are achieved with the second scenario, where also GPS 
constellation is considered. 
 
Scenario #2– Nominal conditions – GPS-Galileo dual constellation 
URA 0.70 m for each satellite in view 
SISA-IPF 0.85 m for each satellite in view 
SISA at the user level SISA-IPF∙1.1 
SISMA 0.7 m for each satellite in view 
Table 5-16: Simulation data in nominal conditions, GPS-Galileo dual constellation 
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Figure 5-14: Integrity Risk results in nominal conditions (GPS-Galileo dual constellation) 
 
As expected, the final integrity risk is lower than the threshold and no 
alarms are raised by the combined system. 
5.3.5 Degraded conditions 
Here follow results in several degraded scenarios, considering a single and a 
dual constellation. 
 
The first test considers a slightly degraded situation, in which Galileo SISA 
doesn‟t have the nominal value of 0.85 m, but 1.0 m for all satellites in 
view. 
 
Scenario #1 – Degraded SISA - Galileo only 
SISA-IPF 1.0 m for each satellite in view 
SISA at the user level SISA-IPF∙1.1 
SISMA 0.7 m for each satellite in view 
Table 5-17: Simulation data with degraded SISA, Galileo constellation only 
 
As expected, the total integrity risk is higher than the nominal case, but still 
below the threshold. Therefore, no alarms are raised in this case and the user 
can safely perform a critical operation. 
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Figure 5-15: Integrity Risk results with degraded SISA (Galileo constellation only) 
 
 
A similar test has then been performed considering also the GPS system. 
 
Scenario #2– Degraded SISA - GPS-Galileo dual constellation 
URA 0.70 m for each satellite in view 
SISA-IPF 1.0 m for each satellite in view 
SISA at the user level SISA-IPF∙1.1 
SISMA 0.7 m for each satellite in view 
Table 5-18: Simulation data with degraded SISA, GPS-Galileo dual constellation 
 
As expected, with the combined system the total Integrity Risk is smaller 
than in the single constellation case, as shown in the next figure. 
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Figure 5-16: Integrity Risk results with degraded SISA (GPS-Galileo dual constellation) 
 
 
The second test considers a degraded value for Galileo SISMA, being 1.0 m 
for all satellites instead of 0.7 m.  
 
Scenario #3 – Degraded SISMA - Galileo only 
SISA-IPF 0.85 m for each satellite in view 
SISA at the user level SISA-IPF∙1.1 
SISMA 1.0 m for each satellite in view 
Table 5-19: Simulation data with degraded SISMA, Galileo constellation only 
 
In this case, for some geometries, the total integrity risk exceeds the 
threshold. Therefore, some alarms are raised by the system, to warn the user 
about an unsafe computed position. This means that for these cases, the 
precision approach can‟t be performed relying only on the satellite 
navigation system. Thus, this situation represents a truly critical event for 
the user. 
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Figure 5-17: Integrity Risk results with degraded SISMA (Galileo constellation only) 
 
This critical situation can be avoided considering a combined system. 
Indeed, the following results show that in combination with GPS, even in 
these degraded conditions, the total Integrity Risk can be kept below the 
threshold and no alarms are raised. 
 
Scenario #4– Degraded SISMA - GPS-Galileo dual constellation 
URA 0.70 m for each satellite in view 
SISA-IPF 0.85 m for each satellite in view 
SISA at the user level SISA-IPF∙1.1 
SISMA 1.0 m for each satellite in view 
Table 5-20: Simulation data with degraded SISMA, GPS-Galileo dual constellation 
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Figure 5-18: Integrity Risk results with degraded SISMA (GPS-Galileo dual constellation) 
 
 
The next tests consider an even more degraded scenario where both SISA 
and SISMA are degraded. The first scenario considers only the Galileo 
constellation, while the second scenario considers the combined system. 
 
 
Scenario #5 – Degraded SISA and SISMA - Galileo only 
SISA-IPF 1.0 m for each satellite in view 
SISA at the user level SISA-IPF∙1.1 
SISMA 1.0 m for each satellite in view 
Table 5-21: Simulation data with degraded SISA and SISMA, Galileo constellation only 
 
As expected, in the single constellation case, the total integrity risk is higher 
than the threshold and there are even more alarms than the previous case. 
 
114                                                         Chapter 5: Multisystem Integrity 
 
 
 
Figure 5-19: Integrity Risk results with degraded SISA and SISMA (Galileo constellation 
only) 
 
 
On the other hand, for the dual constellation the total integrity risk is below 
the threshold and no alarm shall be raised. This means that in a dual 
constellation, even in this case, the combined system provides a safe 
position to the user. 
 
Scenario #6– Degraded SISA and SISMA - GPS-Galileo dual 
constellation 
URA 0.70 m for each satellite in view 
SISA-IPF 1.0 m for each satellite in view 
SISA at the user level SISA-IPF∙1.1 
SISMA 1.0 m for each satellite in view 
Table 5-22: Simulation data with degraded SISA and SISMA, GPS-Galileo dual 
constellation 
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Figure 5-20: Integrity Risk results with degraded SISA and SISMA (GPS-Galileo dual 
constellation) 
 
 
The next test will consider also a degrade value for URA, together with 
degraded values for SISA and SISMA. 
 
Scenario #7– Degraded SISA,  SISMA  and URA - GPS-Galileo dual 
constellation 
URA 1.0 m for each satellite in view 
SISA-IPF 1.0 m for each satellite in view 
SISA at the user level SISA-IPF∙1.1 
SISMA 1.0 m for each satellite in view 
Table 5-23: Simulation data with degraded SISA, SISMA and URA, GPS-Galileo dual 
constellation 
 
Even in this case, for a dual constellation, a precision approach can be safely 
performed, as shown in the next figure. 
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Figure 5-21: Integrity Risk results with degraded SISA, SISMA and URA (GPS-Galileo 
dual constellation) 
 
5.3.6 Bias on SISA and URA 
In these tests a bias (a step) is added to the SISA and URA values for 1 or 2 
random Galileo and GPS satellites respectively. These tests were performed 
in both the nominal and degraded conditions analysed in the previous 
sections. Therefore, the general test conditions are the same of the previous 
cases. As stated before, a bias on SISA or on URA can represent an 
instantaneous undetected failure affecting only a specific satellite. 
The next figures will show only the results in the worst case scenario, which 
is the one with degraded SISA and SISMA values and with biases affecting 
two Galileo satellites. However, the tests that have been performed have 
shown agreements to the expected results also in less critical conditions. 
 
 
Scenario #1 – Severely Degraded conditions - Galileo only 
SISA-IPF 1.0 m for each satellite in view 
SISA at the user level SISA-IPF∙1.1 
Bias on SISA 5 m 
Satellites affected by bias Galileo satellite #1 and #2 
SISMA 1.0 m for each satellite in view 
Table 5-24: Simulation data in severely degraded conditions with SISA bias on two Galileo 
satellites (Galileo constellation only) 
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In this case, as shown in the next picture, the total integrity risk is in many 
cases above the threshold and consequently several alarms have to be raised 
by the system. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-22: Integrity Risk in severely degraded conditions with SISA bias on two Galileo 
satellites (Galileo constellation only) 
 
 
However, a combined system still provides a safe solution, being the total 
integrity risk less than the requirement for all epochs, as shown in the next 
figures. 
 
Scenario #2 – Severely Degraded conditions – GPS-Galileo dual 
constellation 
URA 0.7 m for each satellite in view 
SISA-IPF 1.0 m for each satellite in view 
SISA at the user level SISA-IPF∙1.1 
Bias on SISA 5 m 
Satellites affected by bias Galileo satellite #1 and #2 
SISMA 1.0 m for each satellite in view 
Table 5-25: Simulation data in severely degraded conditions with SISA bias on two Galileo 
satellites (GPS-Galileo dual constellation) 
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Figure 5-23: Integrity Risk in severely degraded conditions with SISA bias on two Galileo 
satellites (GPS-Galileo dual constellation) 
 
 
The last test considers degraded values for URA and also biases affecting 
two GPS satellites. 
 
Scenario #3 – Severely Degraded conditions – GPS-Galileo dual 
constellation 
URA 1.0 m for each satellite in view 
SISA-IPF 1.0 m for each satellite in view 
SISA at the user level SISA-IPF∙1.1 
Bias on SISA and URA 5 m 
Satellites affected by bias Galileo satellite #1 and #2, GPS 
satellite #1 and #2 
SISMA 1.0 m for each satellite in view 
Table 5-26: Simulation data in severely degraded conditions with SISA bias on two Galileo 
satellites and URA bias on two GPS satellites (GPS-Galileo dual constellation) 
 
Even in this very critical scenario, the Galileo integrity algorithm for the 
combined system is able to provide an Integrity Risk lower than the specific 
requirement, as shown in the next figure. 
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Figure 5-24: Integrity Risk in severely degraded conditions with SISA bias on two Galileo 
satellites and URA bias on two GPS satellites (GPS-Galileo dual constellation) 
 
Although more critical scenarios can be considered (e.g., more than two 
biases affecting Galileo or GPS satellites), they are very unlikely to happen 
and therefore they haven‟t been considered in this analysis. 
 
In conclusion, this technique even if it is based on a very different concept 
than protection levels, it has shown the benefits coming out from a 
combined system using an extended version of the Galileo Integrity 
equation. In particular, with a dual constellation Integrity Risk requirements 
can be satisfied even in presence of heavily degraded scenarios.  
 
The Galileo integrity concept is more complete than GPS/SBAS and RAIM 
integrity concepts and offers more protection to failures. On the other hand, 
this concept still needs further investigations, in particular regarding 
assumptions to be used for the error distributions and the parameters to be 
considered in the integrity equation. Indeed, although more complete, the 
new integrity concept introduced by Galileo is more complex and less 
intuitive than SBAS and RAIM protection level concept. 
 
It is important to notice that this technique could be still used in 
combination with RAIM algorithms, which offer further barriers in case of 
local errors. As stated before, the Galileo Integrity algorithm at the user 
level is not able to detect instantaneous local failure as RAIM algorithms do. 
Therefore, using a combination of the two techniques, as also described in 
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[24], could lead to a very safe computed position and could guarantee 
precision approaches even for the most demanding categories of flight. 
5.4 Other multisystem integrity techniques 
In the next paragraphs other possible multisystem integrity techniques will 
be briefly described and they represent future possible research topics. Both 
the techniques here introduced consider the protection level concept as the 
basis for a multisystem integrity algorithm. In the first case, specific 
protection levels can be derived directly from the total integrity risk 
computed with the Galileo integrity algorithm, while in the second case the 
SBAS protection level concept is used. 
5.4.1 Galileo Protection Levels 
At the moment aviation receivers use the protection level concept, which is 
the current standard. Therefore, it could be possible to derive protection 
levels also for Galileo directly from the computed total integrity risk [12]. 
This could be done in two ways: the first method is more straightforward, 
but more conservative, the second method is less conservative, but more 
computationally involved and results in a degraded availability. 
 
In the first case, whenever the integrity risk at the horizontal and vertical 
alert limits for the specific phase of flight is below the allocated integrity 
risk, these alert limits are also output as the protection levels for that 
specific application. If the computed integrity risk is larger than the 
allocated one, the system is declared unavailable for this specific user and 
user geometry and no protection levels have to be provided. Such 
computation of Protection Level does not affect the Service performance 
and is equivalent to the Galileo integrity risk computation at Alert Limit. 
Although no additional workload is requested for the user receiver by this 
computation, the resulting protection level is very conservative. 
 
In the second case a split between the allocated horizontal and vertical 
contributions at the user design level has to be done: 
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𝐻𝑃𝐿 = 𝑓𝐻
−1  𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼 ,𝐻,𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐  𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈 , 𝐻𝐴𝐿𝑈   
𝑉𝑃𝐿 = 𝑓𝑉
−1  𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼 ,𝑉,𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐  𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈 , 𝐻𝐴𝐿𝑈   
Eq. 5-14 
 
where: 
 
𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼 ,𝐻,𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐  𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈 , 𝐻𝐴𝐿𝑈 
= 𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼 𝑉𝐴𝐿𝐷 , 𝐻𝐴𝐿𝐷 ⋅
𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼 ,𝐻 𝐻𝐴𝐿𝑈 
𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼 ,𝐻 𝐻𝐴𝐿𝑈 + 𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼 ,𝑉 𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈 
 
𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼 ,𝑉,𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐  𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈 , 𝐻𝐴𝐿𝑈 
= 𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼 𝑉𝐴𝐿𝐷 , 𝐻𝐴𝐿𝐷 ⋅
𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼 ,𝑉 𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈 
𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼 ,𝐻 𝐻𝐴𝐿𝑈 + 𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼 ,𝑉 𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈 
 
 
Eq. 5-15 
 
with VALD and HALD being the vertical and horizontal alert limits of the 
system design (20 meters and 12 meters respectively), VALU and HALU the 
alert limits at the user design level, which depend on the specific application 
(e.g., for LPV-200 they are  35 meters and 40 meters respectively), 
PHMI,H(HALU) and PHMI,V(HALU) the integrity risk calculated at the user 
design alert limits. Because it is not possible to resolve the inverse functions 
fH
-1
 and fV
-1
 analytically, an iterative method to compute the Protection 
Levels HPL and VPL must be applied. Therefore, even if this second 
method produces less conservative values for the protection level, it is more 
complex and it has the drawback of a fixed split between horizontal and 
vertical integrity risk, which degrades the availability of the system. 
 
However, the protection level concept in Galileo could then be extended in 
order to include also GPS in a combined system. Therefore, when the total 
integrity risk of the combined system is computed, as shown in the previous 
sections, protection levels could be derived using the methods described 
here. 
5.4.2 SBAS Protection Levels 
SBAS Protection Level equations, described in chapter 2, could be extended 
in order to include also Galileo data for a combined system. In particular, 
the following two equations should be considered: 
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𝐻𝑃𝐿𝑆𝐵𝐴𝑆 =  
𝑘𝐻,𝑁𝑃𝐴 ∙ 𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟                            (en-route to LNAV)
𝑘𝐻,𝑃𝐴  ∙  𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟   (LNAV/VNAV, LP, LPV approach)
  
Eq. 5-16 
 
𝑉𝑃𝐿𝑆𝐵𝐴𝑆 = 𝑘𝑉 ∙ 𝑑𝑈  
Eq. 5-17 
 
where dmajor and dU include now also Galileo‟s range error contribution 
(SISA).  
 
This approach has the major drawback of not including any faulty case, as 
the Galileo Integrity concept does. Therefore, only partial information 
coming from Galileo is used, because SISMA parameter is not included in 
the previous two equations, as well as an estimation of the magnitude of the 
undetected bias. Moreover, as stated in the previous paragraph, a fixed split 
of the integrity risk due to the protection level concept degrades the total 
system availability. Nonetheless, this method has the advantage of using the 
protection level concept, which is the current standard in the civil aviation 
receiver and it is easier to implement than the complex Galileo integrity 
algorithm.  
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Conclusions 
So far the integrity concept for modern satellite navigations systems has 
been presented and some new multisystem integrity techniques have been 
proposed.  
 
The initial analysis has showed that current GPS needs augmentation 
systems in order to provide integrity: these augmentation systems improve 
GPS safety and accuracy, but have some limitations. Indeed, when 
considering RAIM algorithms in combination with only GPS constellation, 
a limited integrity is provided and only few categories of flight can be 
satisfied, because RAIM algorithms have been originally designed to detect 
only one single failure in one system. Thus, RAIM algorithms in the case of 
a single constellation are not able to protect user against multiple failures, 
without paying a high price in terms of availability. Indeed, it has been 
shown that, while both integrity and availability are satisfied in case of 
single constellation and single failure, only one of them can be satisfied in 
case of multiple failures for single constellation: in particular, if integrity is 
satisfied (in terms of probability of missed detection), availability is not, 
being the protection level higher than the corresponding alert limit; on the 
other hand, when protection level is lower than the corresponding alert limit, 
the Pmd requirement is no longer satisfied. 
 
Then, it has been shown that SBAS-like systems, such as EGNOS, are able 
to detect and protect user from multiple failures, but also in this case a high 
price in terms of system availability could be paid. Indeed, in case of very 
bad geometries, the system could be declared unavailable when protection 
levels become higher than the required alert limits. This could happen quite 
often in case of a single constellation. Moreover, there is an inherent delay 
that is introduced in the detection of an error, due to the time it takes to 
uplink information on errors. However, the original technique that has been 
used to analyse the EGNOS reaction to GPS clock anomalies has shown that 
EGNOS has excellent capabilities to detect and correct failures due to clock 
errors in the GPS satellites that were not detected by the GPS Ground 
Segment. Clock anomalies are usually compensated with the long and fast 
terms corrections, but in some cases the user can be warned to exclude the 
failed satellite from the final solution. In all the cases that were analysed, the 
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position errors were correctly bounded by the protection levels and these 
results were confirmed using the Stanford-ESA Integrity Diagrams. 
The multisystem scenario has then been described and new parameters and 
definitions have been introduced: in particular, probability of failure, 
probability of false alarm and probability of missed detection for a dual 
constellation system have been derived. This scenario represents the test-bed 
under which the proposed multisystem integrity techniques have been 
analysed.  
 
The first and most straightforward multisystem integrity method is an 
extension of the current RAIM algorithms to a dual constellation in presence 
of multiple failures: this technique has shown very good results both in 
terms of availability and integrity. Indeed, RAIM algorithms in a combined 
system are able to protect user even in case of multiple failures without 
trading integrity with availability. Moreover, this technique adds no 
additional effort in terms of computational load and system cost. 
 
On the other hand, the second technique is based on the new Galileo 
integrity concept, which is more complete than current GPS/SBAS and 
RAIM integrity concepts and offers more protection to failures. The analysis 
has shown that in case of a combined system, the Integrity Risk requirement 
can be satisfied even in presence of heavily degraded scenarios. In this way, 
precision approaches for demanding categories of flight can still be 
performed. This technique makes use of all the available data coming from 
GPS and Galileo and combines them in an extended Galileo Integrity 
equation. However, this concept still needs further investigations, in 
particular regarding assumptions to be used for the error distributions and 
the parameters to be considered in the integrity equation. Indeed, although 
more complete, the new integrity concept introduced by Galileo is more 
complex and less intuitive than SBAS and RAIM protection level concept 
and it is still under development. 
 
It is important to notice that the two techniques that have been proposed can 
be used together, since RAIM algorithms offer further barriers in case of 
local errors. Indeed, as it has been shown, the Galileo Integrity algorithm at 
the user level is not able to detect instantaneous local failure as RAIM 
algorithms do. Therefore, using a combination of these two techniques 
could lead to a very safe computed position and could guarantee precision 
approaches even for the most demanding categories of flight. 
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The other multisystem integrity techniques that have been briefly introduced 
in the last chapter represent the starting point for new research topics.  
 
Furthermore, additional systems, such as inertial sensors (INS), could be 
also considered in combination with satellite navigation systems, in order to 
provide integrity, for example, in railway scenarios, where the satellite 
signal can be frequently lost in long galleries. 
 
Moreover, the proposed multisystem integrity techniques could be further 
extended in order to include other navigation systems, such as GLONASS 
and the upcoming Chinese COMPASS and Indian GAGAN. This also 
represents a further possible new research topic. 
 
However, it should be noted that the satellite navigation scenario is 
continuously evolving. Thus, the proposed techniques could be further 
updated once the upcoming Galileo system will be finally deployed and the 
current GPS will be completely modernised. 
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Appendix A  
Error sources  
All pseudorange measurements are biased, according to the equation [32]: 
 
s
ur c t t I T              
Eq. A-1 
 
being 𝜌 the measured pseudorange, r the geometric range between the user 
position and the satellite, c the velocity of light in a vacuum, 𝛿𝑡𝑢  and 𝛿𝑡
𝑠 
respectively the receiver and satellite clock bias relative to GPST, 𝐼𝜌   and 𝑇𝜌  
the error contributions due to the ionospheric and tropospheric delays and 𝜖𝜌   
the contribution of unmodeled effects, modelling errors and measurement 
errors (e.g., multipath). In the previous equation no explicit reference to the 
measurement epoch was used for simplicity. 
 
The measurements errors can be grouped in three types: 
 
 errors in the parameter values that are broadcast by a satellite in its 
navigation message for which the Control Segment is responsible 
 errors due to the propagation medium, which affects the travel time 
of the signal from the satellite to the receiver 
 receiver noise, which affects the precision of a measurement and 
interference from signals reflected from surfaces in the vicinity of 
the antenna. 
A.1. Control Segment errors: satellite clock and 
ephemeris 
The Control Segment errors are due to incorrect values of the satellite clock 
and ephemeris parameters computed by the Control Segment and broadcast 
by the satellite in the navigation message. Indeed, the current values of these 
parameters are obtained using a Kalman filter and then a prediction model is 
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used to generate the ephemeris and clock parameters to be uploaded to the 
satellites and broadcast by them in the navigation message. There are errors 
in both the estimation of the current values of the parameters and the 
prediction of their future values. The prediction error grows with the age of 
data (AoD), defined as the time since the last parameter upload. Clearly, 
these errors are low if an accurate model to estimate and predict the 
ephemeris and clock parameters is used and if there are frequent data 
uploads to the satellites.  
Satellite clock errors 
The GPS satellites clocks are not synchronized with the GPST (GPS Time): 
indeed there is a bias relative to GPST 
 
s s
GPSt t t    
Eq. A-2  
 
being t
s
 the time kept by the satellite clock and tGPS the GPS Time, defined 
by the Control Segment on the basis of a set of atomic standards aboard the 
satellites and in monitor stations. 
 
The satellite clock bias is modelled as a quadratic function over a time 
interval. The parameters {af0, af1, af2} of this model are computed by the 
Control Segment on the basis of measurements at GPS monitor stations and 
they are, respectively, the clock bias (seconds), the clock drift 
(seconds/seconds) and the frequency drift (seconds/seconds
2
) and in GPS 
they are broadcast in subframe 1 of the navigation message. 
 
At time tGPS: 
 
 
   
2
0 1 0 2 0
s
f f GPS c f GPS c rt a a t t a t t t        
Eq. A-3 
 
where t0c is the reference time for the model in GPST and rt  is a 
relativistic correction term, given by: 
 
kr EAFet sin  
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where  𝑒,  𝐴, 𝐸𝑘  are orbital parameters (subframes 2 and 3 for GPS) and 
 
    
 
with: 
 
3
14
2
3.986005 10    
m
s
          Earth‟s universal gravitational parameter 
 
82.99792458 10
m
c
s
            speed of light 
 
The control segment will utilize the following alternative but equivalent 
expression for the relativistic effect when estimating the NAV parameters: 
 
2
2
r
R V
t
c

  
 
    
  
where R

 is the instantaneous position vector of the SV, V

 is the 
instantaneous velocity vector of the SV and c is the speed of light. 
It is immaterial whether the vectors R

 and V

 are expressed in earth-fixed, 
rotating coordinates or in earth-centered, inertial coordinates. 
These parameters are computed using a curve-fit to predicted estimates of 
the actual satellite clock errors. Thus, a residual clock error 𝛿𝑡 remains, 
which, for GPS, corresponds to a range error of 0.3 - 4 meters. The value of 
the residual error depends on two factors: 
 
 Type of satellite 
 Age of the broadcast data (AOD) 
 
At 0AOD the residual error is 0.8 m, while after 24 hours since the data 
upload is 1 - 4 m. 
Since user tracks satellites with AOD between 0 and 24 hours, in the 
statistical model for clock errors it is appropriate to average over AOD. 
 
mc
F
sec
10442807633.4
2 10
2
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
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Satellite ephemeris errors 
The ephemeris error is usually decomposed into components along three 
orthogonal directions defined relative to the satellite orbit: radial, along-
track and cross-track. In estimation of an orbit based on range 
measurements, the radial component of the ephemeris error tends to be the 
smallest. The along-track and cross-track can be several times larger. 
Anyway, the error in a pseudorange measurement is the projection of the 
satellite position error vector on the satellite-receiver line of sight, which 
depends mostly upon the radial component of the ephemeris error. The 
components of the along-track and cross-track errors along the line of sight 
are small. 
 
The range error due to the errors in the clock and ephemeris parameters is 
defined as the root-sum-square value of the clock error and the line-of-sight 
component of the ephemeris error. The size of this error is estimated and 
tracked by the Control Segment in real time within 1 m rms. With typical 
once-a-day data uploads, the current estimates of the rms range errors due to 
the ephemeris and clock parameters are about 1.5 m each. The Control 
Segment monitors the growth in parameter errors by comparing the 
broadcasted values to the best current estimates available. If the estimated 
range error for a satellite exceeds a threshold, a „contingency data upload‟ is 
scheduled (the threshold is 5 m). 
The Block IIF satellites are planned to maintain the clock and ephemeris 
errors below 3 m up to sixty days out of contact with the Control Segment in 
Autonav mode and up to three hours in normal mode. 
 
A.2. Propagation errors 
Ionospheric error 
Ionosphere is responsible for signal delay/advance. Since the error due to 
ionosphere is frequency-dependent, it can be completely eliminated using a 
dual frequency receiver. In the single frequency case, the ionospheric error 
can be partially corrected using ionospheric models. 
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Single frequency model 
For a single frequency GPS receiver the ionospheric error can be computed 
according to the Klobuchar model, as described in [9]. This is an empirical 
model and it is estimated to reduce the rms range error due to 
uncompensated ionospheric delay by about 50%. At mid-latitudes the 
remaining error in zenith delay can be up to 10m during the day and much 
worse during heightened solar activity. 
The model gives the expression for the ionospheric delay for L1, while the 
delay for L2 can be easily computed using the well known frequency 
relation. 
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Broadcast parameters 
n : coefficients of a cubic equation representing the amplitude of the 
vertical delay (n=0,1,2,3) 
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n : coefficients of a cubic equation representing the period of the model 
(n=0,1,2,3) 
Both the parameters are broadcast by satellites in the navigation message. 
 
Receiver parameters 
E : elevation angle [semi-circles] 
A : azimuth angle [semi-circles] 
u : user geodetic latitude (WGS-84) [semi-circles] 
u : user geodetic longitude (WGS-84) [semi-circles] 
GPStime : receiver computed system time 
 
Computed parameters 
x : phase [rad] 
F : obliquity factor 
t : local time [s] 
m : geomagnetic latitude of the earth projection of the ionospheric 
intersection point [semi-circles] 
i : geodetic longitude of the earth projection of the ionospheric intersection 
point [semi-circles] 
i : geodetic latitude of the earth projection of the ionospheric intersection 
point [semi-circles] 
 : earth‟s central angle between the user position and the earth projection 
of the ionospheric intersection point [semi-circles] 
 
It should be noted that all the angles should be converted to semi-circles: 
 
semi-circles=deg/180 and semi-circles=rad/
 
however, when using the angles inside the sine and cosine functions they 
shouldn‟t be converted to semi-circles. 
 
Dual frequency receiver 
A dual frequency receiver is able to accurately calculate the ionospheric 
error and so to remove it almost completely. Indeed, the ionospheric-free 
pseudorange is given by: 
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where 1L and 2L are the code measurements for L1 and L2. 
However this approach has the drawback that measurement errors are 
significantly magnified through the combination. A preferred approach, as 
suggested by [6], is to use L1 and L2 pseudorange measurements to estimate 
the ionospheric error on L1 using: 
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Eq. A-6 
 
These corrections, eventually smoothed over time, are then subtracted from 
pseudorange measurements. 
When using also phase measurements, it is possible to perform a much more 
accurate computation of ionospheric delay. Moreover, with phase 
measurements it is also possible to accurately calculate the Total Electron 
Content (TEC). TEC is the integral of the electron density on the receiver-
to-satellite path. The TEC is measured in electrons/m
2
 or in TEC units 
(TECU) where 1 TECU = 10
16
 electrons/m
2
. 1 TECU corresponds to about 
16cm of delay on L1. 
Although phase measurements give much more accurate results than code 
measurements, they have the drawback that integer ambiguity should be 
resolved. Thus, a combination of phase measurements and code 
measurements allow a very precise and unambiguous computation for 
ionospheric delay and TEC.  
Tropospheric error 
Troposphere induces an error in the range measurement that is frequency-
independent. Therefore, there is no way to compensate it using a dual 
frequency receiver. However, current models well estimate the tropospheric 
error. 
Defining the refractivity as [6]: 
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N=10
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two components contributes to the total error due to the troposphere: 
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being respectively the dry and the wet component at the sea level, with: 
p0: partial pressure of the dry component at standard sea level [mbar] 
T0: absolute temperature at standard sea level [K] 
a1: empirical constant = 77.624 [K/mbar] 
a2: empirical constant = -12.92 [K/mbar] 
a3: empirical constant = 371000 [K
2
/mbar] 
e0: partial pressure of the wet component at standard sea level [mbar] 
 
As a function of the height, the two components become: 
,0( )
d
d d
d
h h
N h N
h

 
  
 
  ,0( )
w
w w
w
h h
N h N
h

 
  
 
 
 
with: 
 
0
6
,0
0.011385
10
d
d
p
h
N 


 06
,0 0
1 1.255
0.0113851 0.05
10
w
w
h e
N T
 
  
  
 
 
4   (ideal gas law) 
 
 
At the zenith (elevation angle=90°) the tropospheric error is then: 
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Eq. A-7 
 
The previous formula needs pressure and temperature as inputs, which can 
be obtained using meteorological sensors. 
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Another method without using meteorological sensors considers other semi-
empirical parameters: 
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with: 
 
k1 = 77.604 [K/mbar] 
k2 = 382000 [K
2
/mbar] 
Rd = 287.054 [J/kg/K] 
gm = 9.784 [m/s
2
] 
g = 9.80665 [m/s
2
] 
 
while the following parameters are given in tables: 
 
  : temperature lapse rate [K/m] 
T : temperature [K] 
  : water vapour lapse rate [unitless] 
p : pressure [mbar] 
e : water vapour pressure [mbar] 
 
and: 
 
H : height [m] 
 
 
For elevations different than 90°, the tropospheric error is given by: 
 
tropo d dry w wetS m d m d    
Eq. A-8 
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or 
 
( )tropo dry wetS m d d    
Eq. A-9 
 
with: 
md : dry component mapping function 
mw : wet component mapping function 
m : general mapping function 
 
An example of mapping function ([6]) is: 
 
2
1.001
( )
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m E
E

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where E is the elevation angle. 
 
A.3. User level errors 
Receiver noise 
The code and carrier measurements are affected by random measurement 
noise, called receiver noise, which includes: noise introduced by the 
antenna, amplifiers, cables and the receiver; multi-access noise (i.e., 
interference from other GPS signals and GPS-like broadcasts from system 
augmentations); signal quantization noise. In the absence of any interfering 
signals, a receiver sees a waveform which is sum of the GPS signal and 
randomly fluctuating noise. Therefore, the fine structure of a signal can be 
masked by noise, especially if the signal-to-noise ratio is low. The 
measurement error due to receiver noise highly varies with the signal 
strength, which, in turn, varies with satellite elevation angle and therefore 
with geometry.  
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Multipath 
Multipath refers to the phenomenon of a signal reaching the antenna via two 
or more paths. Typically, an antenna receives the direct signal and one or 
more of its reflections from structures in the vicinity and from the ground. A 
reflected signal is a delayed and usually weaker version of the direct signal. 
The subsequent code and carrier phase measurements are the sum of the 
received signals the range measurement error due to multipath depends upon 
the strength of the reflected signal and the delay between the direct and 
reflected signals. Multipath affects both code and carrier measurements, but 
the magnitude of the error differs significantly. 
Typical multipath error in pseudorange measurements varies from 1 m in a 
benign environment to more than 5 m in highly reflective environment. The 
corresponding errors in the carrier phase measurements are typically two 
orders of magnitude smaller (1-5 cm). 
A.4. Error distributions 
The final User Equivalent Range Error (UERE) is composed by the three 
main contributions seen in the previous sections: 
 
 Signal-In-Space (SIS) Range Error, which takes into account 
ephemeris and clock estimation errors. This parameter, called URE 
(User Range Error), is not known and therefore it has to be estimated 
by the ground segment and transmitted to the user. In the case of 
GPS, the estimation of the URE is the URA (User Range Accuracy). 
 Propagation range error, which takes into account the ionospheric 
and tropospheric delays. However, the tropospheric delay is mostly 
considered a local phenomenon. The ionospheric contribution in a 
dual frequency environment is almost negligible. 
 Local range errors, which affect the specific user receiver and they 
include multipath and receiver noise as well as tropospheric delay. 
 
Each of these contributions can be characterised by an error distribution. 
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Figure A-1: User Equivalent Range Error 
 
 
Since the error distributions are assumed to be uncorrelated, we have: 
 
2 2 2 2 2 2
UERE URE IONO TROPO noise multi           
Eq. A-10 
 
The typical error budgets for GPS (both Precise Positioning and Standard 
Positioning Services) are summarised in the next two tables. 
 
 
Segment Source Error Source 1 Error (m) 
Space/Control 
Broadcast clock 1.1 
Broadcast ephemeris 0.8 
User 
Residual ionospheric delay 0.1 
Residual tropospheric delay 0.2 
Receiver noise and 
resolution 
0.1 
Multipath 0.2 
System UERE Total (RSS) 1.4 
Table A-1: GPS Precise Positioning Service Typical UERE Budget [6] 
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Segment Source Error Source 1 Error (m) 
Space/Control 
Broadcast clock 1.1 
L1 P(Y)-L1 C/A group delay 0.3 
Broadcast ephemeris 0.8 
User 
Ionospheric delay 7.0 
Tropospheric delay 0.2 
Receiver noise and 
resolution 
0.1 
Multipath 0.2 
System UERE Total (RSS) 7.1 
Table A-2: GPS Standard Positioning Service Typical UERE Budget [6] 
Appendix B: Overbounding techniques 141 
 
 
Appendix B  
Overbounding techniques 
The Ground Segment monitors the errors in the range domain and provides 
parameters that characterize the error distribution in the range domain. Since 
the actual error distribution is not a true Gaussian, broadcast 𝜍 values 
describe a range domain error distribution that is a zero-mean Gaussian and 
that overbounds the actual range domain error distribution. There are 
different overbounding techniques: 
 
 Tail overbounding 
 Pdf overbounding 
 Cdf overbounding 
In tail overbounding, the overbounding cumulative distribution (CDF), Go, 
obeys the following relationship with respect to the actual CDF, Ga: 
 
 
𝐺𝑜 𝑥 = −𝑉𝐴𝐿 ≥ 𝐺𝑎 𝑥 = −𝑉𝐴𝐿 
 1 − 𝐺𝑜 𝑥 = 𝑉𝐴𝐿  ≥ (1 − 𝐺𝑎 𝑥 = 𝑉𝐴𝐿 )
  
Eq. B-1 
 
Tail overbounding in the range domain does not guarantee tail 
overbounding in the position domain. 
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Figure B-1: Tail area overbounding 
 
A Pdf overbound is defined such that the overbounding distribution exceeds 
the actual distribution for every point outside the VAL: 
 
𝑔𝑜 𝑥 ≥ 𝑔𝑎 𝑥 , ∀ 𝑥 > 𝑉𝐴𝐿 
Eq. B-2 
 
 
Figure B-2: Pdf overbounding 
 
A Cdf overbound is defined such that the cumulative distribution function of 
the overbound, Go, is always shifted towards its tails relative to the actual 
cumulative distribution function, Ga, according to: 
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𝐺𝑜 𝑥 ≥ 𝐺𝑎 𝑥 ,   ∀𝐺𝑎 <
1
2
𝐺𝑜 𝑥 ≤ 𝐺𝑎 𝑥 ,   ∀𝐺𝑎 ≥
1
2
  
Eq. B-3 
 
 
Figure B-3: Cdf overbounding 
 
The Cdf based strategy offers an effective way to link range and position-
domain overbounding rather than pdf overbounding, but only for some 
specific distributions. Indeed, [27] demonstrated that the overbounding in 
the position domain can be guaranteed only for symmetric, zero-mean, 
unimodal distributions. 
 
A more general overbounding technique that effectively relates range-
domain and position-domain overbounding for an arbitrary distribution is 
the paired overbounding method described in [28]. This method guarantees 
overbounding in the position domain even for a shifted median, asymmetric 
and multimodal error distribution. 
The paired overbound consists of a left bound and a right bound, defined 
relative to the actual CDF: 
 
𝐺𝐿 𝑥 ≥ 𝐺𝑎 𝑥 , ∀𝑥 
𝐺𝑅 𝑥 ≤ 𝐺𝑎 𝑥 , ∀𝑥 
Eq. B-4 
 
The overbounding Cdf is therefore constructed from the left and right 
bounds: 
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Eq. B-5 
 
The paired overbound‟s additional degrees of freedom enable construction 
of tighter error bounds, particularly for the case of non-zero mean error 
distributions. Moreover, the generality of the paired overbound permits 
bounding arbitrary multipath distributions, including those with more than 
one mode. 
Another overbounding method is suggested by [29] that proposes a pdf 
overbounding with a finite confidence level. This method provides several 
advantages, as increasing user availability and relaxing Galileo SISA 
overbounding requirements still ensuring user integrity risk requirement. 
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